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Abstract 
The southern African region is beset with numerous security concerns: pervasive poverty, deepening 
inequality, starvation, contamination of essential natural resources, violent crime and state oppression. 
However, the most vital of the region‟s security concerns in the 21st century is the spread of infectious 
disease. The region shoulders a disproportionate amount of the continent‟s infectious disease burden, 
with diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria claiming more lives every year than any 
other factor.  The nature of these diseases and their propensity to spread, coupled with inadequate 
regional public health structures pose a significant threat to regional security and stability.  
 
The study asserts that southern Africa‟s security concerns are most appropriately characterised under 
the paradigm of Human Security. It further asserts that if such vital threats to human security are not 
adequately managed they have the ability to permeate across state borders, spelling numerous 
negative ramifications for the region. To this end, the study details the public health crisis in 
Zimbabwe and its effects on regional security and stability in southern Africa. An enduring political 
and economic collapse in Zimbabwe led to the dramatic deterioration of its public health sector, the 
concomitant mass migration of Zimbabwean nationals across the region presented a unique and 
complex challenge to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its member states. 
As the premier regional governance institution, SADC has failed to adequately mobilise its structures 
and member states to respond to the challenges resulting from the public health crisis in Zimbabwe. 
The study explores the factors accounting for this regional inertia, and asserts that while infectious 
diseases are at present the most vital of the human security threats, similar threats to human security 
have the potential to affect the region if SADC fails to recognise and prioritise threats to human 
security as legitimate regional security concerns.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. (It) must be constructed in terms of the 
security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully 
participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights 
 
African Leadership Forum 1991  
The concept of security must change – from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater 
stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, 
from territorial to food, employment and environment 
 
 UNDP 1993 
 
 
Traditionally „security‟ has been perceived as the security of the state (Mutimer, 2008, p. 34). This 
gave rise to the assumption that threats to security arose from outside the state and that these threats 
were primarily if not always military in nature (Ayoob, 1991, p. 261).  This state-centred view has 
dominated security narratives for decades (Buzan, 1991, 1997; Krause, 1996; Booth, 2005). The 
seminal 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) was therefore a distinct departure from this 
narrative, as it spoke to the heart of the security needs of the time. It asserted that rather than fear of 
external military attack, people had more pressing security concerns such as the source of their next 
meal or protection from natural disasters such as floods. It called for a more introspective conception 
of security that addressed the real concerns of humanity, coined as „human security‟. Numerous 
statesmen, authors and scholars came to the fore supporting this notion of human security asserting 
that “the international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security...The state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations and at times has 
even become a source of threat to its own people” (Sen, 2003).  
 
Pervasive poverty, deepening inequality, starvation and disease are the most prominent security 
concerns in Africa. This is especially true for southern Africa which is beset with the highest 
infectious disease burden on the continent (Cooke, 2009, p. 3). The most recent United Nations (UN) 
statistics  show that 11.3 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in the region, an increase of nearly 
one-third (31 percent) compared to the 8.6 million present in the region between 2000 and 2005. Of 
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the 23.3 million people living with HIV in Africa, southern Africa accounts for 49 percent of these 
cases (USAID, 2011, p. 1).  In addition other infectious diseases such as Tuberculosis (TB) are 
widespread, with South Africa reporting 981 cases per 100,000 people and Swaziland at 1,287 per 
100,000 people, the highest in the continent (WHO, 2011a, p. 1). Malawi, Mozambique and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rank among the highest in the worlds lists of infant mortality 
rates, with as many as 192 deaths per 1,000 births being recorded in the DRC. The five lowest life 
expectancies in the world are southern African states: Swaziland, Angola, Zambia, Lesotho and 
Mozambique (UN, 2011).  
 
Caroline Thomas correctly points out that human insecurity is not some inevitable consequence: 
although natural disasters such as floods undermine human security, at the core human insecurity is a 
direct result of the existing structures of power which determine security agendas (Thomas, 2001, p. 
160). This is true at national, regional and even international levels. In southern Africa these negative 
indicators are symptomatic of state dysfunction. Southern African states have failed to ensure 
adequate supplies of food, shelter, health care, water and sanitation to all their citizens, and so the 
populations of the southern African region are chronically insecure. It is established that insecurities 
such as these have an adverse effect on development and social cohesion (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 
2003). In addition, such insecurities have the potential to destabilise the region, affecting order and 
security at the regional level. Such is the case with the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The 
once prosperous state suffered a massive economic collapse, with hyperinflation reaching a record 
high of 89.7 sextillion percent in November 2008 (Hanke, 2008, p. 1). Central to the economic 
collapse was the political rule of the leading party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic 
Front (ZANU – PF). Political oppression, the violent suppression of political opposition, rigged 
elections, human rights abuses, corruption and mismanagement led the country into a state of political 
dysfunction. The resultant economic instability led to capital flight, acute declines in foreign direct 
investment, the suspension of international aid and multilateral credit, and the eventual collapse of the 
entire banking sector. At present the Gross Domestic Product per capita of Zimbabwe is one of the 
lowest in the world at US$487 and unemployment stands at 95 percent  (IMF, 2011). The economic 
and political crisis in the country devastated the government departments, most notably those tasked 
with providing social services. As a result the country struggles to provide its citizens with basic 
amenities such as clean water, sanitation, food, electricity and health care.  
 
The Zimbabwean situation has dominated the political agenda of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)1 since 2000. Efforts led by Thabo Mbeki led to the formation of a Government 
                                                          
1 SADC was formed in 1992, as a successor of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) 
which was formed in 1981. The members of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
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of National Unity (GNU), between President Mugabe and his political opponent Morgan Tsvangirai, 
after a violent and contentious 2008 election. However, new and re-emerging tensions between the 
two parties have caused a political deadlock within the country, which has inevitably been felt 
throughout the region. The political impasse in Zimbabwe translates into insecurity at the individual 
level. A cholera outbreak in 2008 demonstrated just how deeply the political collapse had penetrated 
into the functions of the government. The public health structures of Zimbabwe failed to provide the 
necessary health care and medication to thousands of infected individuals across the country, which 
led to the migration of individuals out of the country, and the spread of cholera throughout the region. 
The enduring crisis in Zimbabwe has raised issues of regional security and stability for southern 
Africa as it is estimated that up to 3.5 million Zimbabweans have migrated throughout the region 
(Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009).  
 
 1.1The Study of Security 
The discipline of International Relations is concerned with the study of the political interactions 
amongst international actors (Hough, 2004, p. 2). Since its inception, this discipline has been 
dominated by Realism. Classic Realists believe that states are the most significant actors in the 
international arena, and that their behaviour is always premised on self- interest and the pursuit of 
power. This approach permeates all other branches of the study of International Relations, including 
that of Security Studies, which is concerned with those international interactions that are particular to 
the maintenance of the security of the actors involved (Hough, 2004, p. 2).  The academic study of 
security and its application to the study of real politik is predominantly focused on the state, military 
defence and strategic alliances. Consequently, issues such as the availability of food or the health of 
the public did not feature within traditional Security Studies.  
 
This overemphasis on state security dominated the 20th century, neglecting less privileged concerns, 
such as the protection of human rights. The conduct of the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War is indicative of this: chiefly concerned with increasing and strengthening their spheres 
of influence, the US and the Soviet Union largely ignored principles of peace and the protection of 
human rights (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999, p. 511). The US government tolerated and supported 
many authoritarian, repressive regimes simply because the leaders of those regimes were willing to 
oppose the Soviet Union (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999, p. 513). For its part, the Soviet Union was 
silent about defects in allied non-communist dictatorships as long as those regimes were opposed to 
the US.  It was only after two World Wars, the collapse of Fascism, Nazism and Colonialism and the 
end of the Cold War, that the international system began to re-orientate the focus of international 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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politics towards the pursuit of peace, and to recognise the need to reaffirm the pledge to ensure the 
safety and welfare of all citizens across the globe (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999, p. 520). Even though 
substantial institutional2 and legislative3 provisions had been established before the onset of the Cold 
War to ensure the safety of individuals, the lack of political will among states during the Cold War 
had resulted in widespread oppression and significant loss of human life. 
 
The end of the Cold War was welcomed by academics such as Matthews, who saw it as an 
opportunity to „re-define security‟ (Matthews, 1989, p. 162). 
 
There was a universal call for the broadening of Security Studies. Scholars and statesmen alike 
acknowledged that concerns of „high politics‟ such as nuclear attack had long dominated the terrain of 
international security agendas, and as such threats had subsided it was time for less recognised though 
equally significant security concerns to come to the fore. State-centred considerations of security that 
focused solely on military capabilities had to be broadened. The overemphasis on military threats 
negated the reality that states could be weakened by circumstances other than military conflict and 
that weapons were not the only threats to human life.  
 
In response to the inadequacies of traditional Security Studies, theorists such as Booth, Krause, Vale 
and Williams have submitted an essential critique of state-focused security perceptions (Booth, 1991, 
2005, 2007; Krause, 1996, 1998; Krause & Williams, 1997; Vale & Booth, 1995, 1997; Vale & 
Swatuk, 1999; Vale, 2003; Booth & Wheeler, 2008). This conception contends that the study of 
security should focus on the individual and individual emancipation rather than on the state. Critical 
Security Studies, the result of their work, asserts that individuals, not states should be the referent 
objects of security analyses, that political realism fails to offer either a satisfactory theory or practice 
of security, and that systems of security based on the insecurity of others are unsustainable 
(Zamarcozy, 2007, p. 1).  
 
A central component of Critical Security Studies is a contestation of the supremacy of the state. 
Traditional Security Studies focuses on the state, that is, the state is the chief referent in security 
agendas and the sole guarantor of security at all levels. As such, the safety of the individual is 
assigned to the state. It was therefore tacitly assumed that if the state was secure, its citizens were also 
secure. However a cursory analysis of international politics will show this assumption to be unjust. 
Firstly, the state itself has become a source of insecurity to individuals. Approximately six million 
                                                          
2 The establishment of the United Nations, and its key organs with regard to security: the United Nations Security Council 
and the United Nations Human Rights Commission.  
3 The ratification of International Laws and Treaties, most notably: The UN Charter – 1945, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights – 1948, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – 1949 and the Geneva 
Conventions – 1949. 
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European Jews were killed under the Nazi government of Germany during WW II (Niewyk, 2000, p. 
45). In 1994 800,000 members of the Tutsi ethnic group were massacred in a state endorsed genocide 
in Rwanda (Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 17). And on March 4, 2009 Sudanese President Omar al Bashir 
became the first sitting president to be indicted for war crimes, for directing a campaign of mass 
killing, rape, and pillaging against civilians in Darfur: the UN estimates that this conflict has claimed 
400,000 lives and displaced up to 2 million people (United Nations, 2010). This condition presents an 
inherent contradiction within traditional Security Studies: how can the state function both as the sole 
referent and beneficiary of international security objectives, while it also periodically functions as a 
source of insecurity to the international system and individuals? Critical Security Studies seeks to 
address this contradiction.   
 
Secondly, placing the state as the only referent in security agendas makes the incorrect assumption 
that only the state can be affected by threats to security. However, the non-military threats mentioned 
above target the state and individuals. Infectious diseases and their effects affect the state as well as 
individuals; as do the effects of climate change, natural disasters and poverty. In some instances even 
the most equipped state structures become overwhelmed and are unable to secure its citizens against 
such dangers. For example, the inability of the US to protect its citizens against Hurricane Katrina in 
2009 claimed 1,836 lives (Knabb, 2005, p. 5). The coastal regions of Mozambique are prone to 
flooding; in 2000 floods killed 700 people and displaced more than half a million, and a further 3 
million in 2001 (BBC, 2011). Drought in Mozambique in 2002 affected 587,000 people, some in the 
previously flood-stricken regions (SADOCC, 2002). Projections in 2012 predicted continued 
flooding, and by January of 2012 4,000 people had already been displaced (BBC, 2012). In this 
context Critical Security Studies makes an appeal to deepen the study of security, asserting that non-
state actors such as societies and individuals should also be considered as security referents, separate 
from and or in addition to the state.  
 
Lastly, the traditional role of the nation-state – as the sole guarantor of security- has been forced to 
change.  The advent of globalisation: the widespread operation of businesses on a global rather than a 
national, level; the ease with which individuals and groups can communicate and organize across 
national frontiers; the global transmission of ideas, norms, and values; the spread of particular forms 
of political institutions; and the increasing participation of states in international political, economic, 
and military organisations, means that the 21st century state is no longer able to guarantee its  
sovereignty, territoriality and monopoly over violence (Ripsman & Paul, 2010, p. 8). Traditional 
mechanisms of security, such as containment, have proven to be inadequate when faced with 
challenges such as international terrorism and global disease epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, thus an 
extension of security agendas is necessary to adapt to the changing climate of international politics. 
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The broadening and deepening of international security ushered in by the end of the Cold War have 
caused a shift in conventional perceptions of security and its study. It is from this evolution in 
Security Studies and the field of Critical Security Studies that the concept of Human Security has 
emerged.  
 
1.2 Human Security 
Human Security is defined as the protection of the vital core of human life from all critical and 
pervasive threats; these threats may be environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political 
in nature (Owen, 2004, p. 380). The 1994 Human Development Report famously asserted “human 
security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP, 1994, p. 
22).  The Human Security paradigm is concerned with the insecurities that plague humanity, such as 
disease and famine, seeking to reduce (or if possible remove) these insecurities, and to ensure the 
well-being of all individuals (Sen, 1999).  
 
The objectives of human security have close links with those of human development (UNDP, 1993, 
1994; Thomas, 2000, 2001; Hettne, 2001, 2010; Tschigri, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Krause & Jutersonke, 
2005; Klingebiel, 2006). Human development simply defined is the process of enlarging choices, it is 
both a process and an outcome that seeks to maximise human capabilities and dignity (UNDP, 2002). 
Freedom, good health, adequate nutrition, education and access to resources are therefore necessary 
for the realisation of positive human development outcomes. Inequality and poverty are the greatest 
threats to the realisation of these goals in the 21st century, and they are also at the heart of the human 
security predicament in the developing world. Therefore, human security and human development are 
intricately linked. Human security concerns have immediate impacts on the well-being of individuals 
and consequently their development. Human security serves as a prerequisite for positive human 
development. In addition high levels of human development enhance human security; thus the two act 
as mutual reinforcement for the other. An assessment of the Human Development Indices of acutely 
insecure regions will demonstrate the significant link between security and human development 
outcomes.  
 
This study acknowledges the strong links between human security and human development but asserts 
that these issues should be considered as components of Security Studies rather than of Development 
Studies.  
 
Development Studies is an interdisciplinary field of the social sciences, concerned with addressing 
matters that are of particular relevance to the developing world. It covers a wide array of issues, 
including demographics, studies of migration, urbanisation, gender equality, education, economic 
development and ecology (Summer, 2006, p. 644). While the focus of Development Studies is 
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humanity, its thrust towards these issues in many cases does not consider the security of the 
individual. By definition the concerns of Human Security are vital, that is, they are essential for the 
continued existence of human life, and thus require more critical responses than those offered within 
Development Studies. For example, the quality of life of an illiterate individual is compromised as 
this may reduce their access to employment and financial resources. However, an individual suffering 
from an infectious disease, such as malaria, faces a more vital concern, as it is not just the quality of 
life that is now compromised, but life itself.  Such vital concerns should thus be considered as issues 
of security, rather than development.  
 
Human Security challenges the foundations of traditional security in that it equates the security of the 
state to that of the individual, whereas traditional perceptions of security place the security of the state 
above all other entities. Within traditional perceptions of security, the sovereignty of the state and the 
integrity of its territory are imperative to international peace and order.  This conception of security 
prioritises defending the state via militarisation and the establishment of strategic alliances, with the 
end goal of deterring external military threats, and establishing predictability and order at domestic 
and international levels. This conception negates the reality that even with all these facets intact 
(sovereignty and territorial integrity) the citizens of a state can still be insecure. Human security 
argues that for many – perhaps even most – people the greatest threats to security come from internal 
conflicts, disease, hunger, environmental contamination or street crime. And for others, a greater 
threat may come from their own country itself, rather than from an external adversary (Newman, 
2010, p. 6).  The contemporary world is testament to this, with states such as Sudan and Syria serving 
as prime examples.   
 
Within the scope of human security, vital concerns such as hunger, poverty, disease, devastation from 
natural disasters and the contamination of vital natural resources (issues excluded from the agendas of 
state security) are recognised as legitimate security concerns. And it is threats of this nature that are 
prevalent in southern Africa.  
 
Southern Africa faces a multitude of security concerns, the most vital of which is the spread of 
infectious disease. The region carries a disproportionate amount of the continent‟s disease burden, 
accounting for 49 percent of the current HIV/AIDS incidence in Africa, which translates to 
approximately 11.3 million people (USAID, 2011, p. 1). South Africa and Swaziland have the highest 
TB rates in the world, with South Africa reporting 981 cases per 100,000 people and Swaziland 1,287 
per 100,000 people (WHO, 2011a, p. 1). Southern Africa has high levels of multi drug resistant TB 
(MDR-TB), a version of the disease that is immune to treatment. In addition to HIV/AIDS and TB, 
the region has high incidences of malaria and diarrhoeal diseases such as cholera, typhoid and 
dysentery. Infectious diseases in the region claim more lives than war, starvation and political 
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violence combined. The provision of public health in the region does not adequately meet the 
requirements of the people (Cooke, 2009, p. 4). The individual SADC states are beset with financial 
and technical shortages in their respective departments of public health. None of the southern African 
states are yet to satisfy the Abuja Agreement that stipulates that at least 15 percent of every African 
state‟s GDP should be directed to the provision of public health (Midzi, 2012). Without a foundation 
of skilled human resources, healthcare systems cannot function adequately or effectively. In southern 
Africa there is an overall lack of personnel in key areas of the health sector; an inequitable distribution 
of those health personnel who are available; and a significant attrition of trained personnel from the 
public health sector and from the region. For example, in 1998 in South Africa, 52.7 percent of all 
general practitioners and 76 percent of all specialists worked in the private health sector. By 1999, 73 
percent of general practitioners were estimated to be working in the private sector in South Africa, 
despite the fact that this sector catered for less than 20 percent of the population (Cornell, 2001). In 
2001 1,596 nurses and midwives from South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe were registered 
with the Medical Council of the United Kingdom, and of the 1,200 physicians trained in Zimbabwe 
during the 1990s, only 360 were still practising in the country in 2001 (Lowell & Findlay, 2001, p. 
14).  
 
It is clear from the immense disease burden of the region, and the state of public health in the 
individual countries that the spread of infectious disease in southern Africa presents a vital human 
security concern in the region.  
 
1.3 Research Goals and Methodology 
This study will employ a case study that focuses on the deterioration of the public health sector of 
Zimbabwe. The purpose of this is two-fold, firstly to demonstrate the vital nature of the threat that 
infectious diseases pose to human security in southern Africa, and secondly, to outline the regional 
ramifications that vital threats of this nature pose to regional security and stability. The study will 
draw on the various branches of International Relations and Security Studies to answer three pertinent 
questions: What is the nature of the security concerns specific to southern Africa? How have these 
concerns affected the region? How has the region responded to these concerns? It will become clear 
that southern Africa faces vital security concerns which are correctly characterised under the 
paradigm of Human Security. The spread of infectious disease in the region is the most vital of these 
security concerns, however, the states of southern Africa have not responded adequately to this vital 
concern. The study will detail the obstacles that impede the region from responding adequately to the 
vital human security concerns that it faces.  
 
The goals of this study are to: Critically explore and define the concept of Human Security, as a 
means to correctly characterise the security concerns present in the region. Secondly, to outline and 
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discuss the nature and significance of the threat that infectious diseases present to human security in 
southern Africa (typified by the Zimbabwean case study). Thirdly, to investigate the responses of the 
region to the human security concerns present ; And lastly, to offer a critical assessment of the 
southern African subcontinent with regard to its inability to adequately respond to the vitals human 
security concerns in the region.  
 
The study is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter Two gives an appraisal of recent and relevant literature on human security, giving a clear 
classification of the concept, its components and its relevance to contemporary International 
Relations. This appraisal will pay particular attention to the developing world, southern Africa, health 
security and global public health. This conceptualisation of Human Security is necessary as there is an 
on-going debate regarding the redefining of security (Buzan 1991; Crawford 1991; Haftendorn 1991; 
Kolodziej 1992; Baldwin 1995; Krause 1996; Hough 2004; Thakur & Newman 2004; Callabero-
Anthony 2006; Booth 2007, 2008). This debate is rooted in the realisation that previous conceptions 
of security that focused on the state do not adequately reflect the security needs present in the post-
Cold War era. In addition, the methods previously employed to handle these threats, would be 
unsuitable in contemporary international politics. Various attempts have been made to provide an 
adequate re-conceptualisation of security, one that encompasses the individual and his/her needs.  
 
Two main contemporary theories of International Relations have contributed to this effort: an 
approach based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, which maintains a continued emphasis on the 
primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of human security, and a postmodernist or 
„critical human security‟ approach that is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics.  
Chapter Two explores the different views of human security and isolates the framework and definition 
of security that best fits southern Africa. It puts forward Human Security as the appropriate lens 
through which to analyse the security concerns of the region and provides a conceptual harness for the 
case study that follows.  
 
Chapter Three functions as a precursor to the focused case study, advocating for the recognition of 
infectious disease as a vital human, national and regional security concern. By analysing the disease 
burden of the region,4 it becomes clear that infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria 
claim more lives in southern Africa than any other cause. Statistics from the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) show that more lives were lost in DRC due to infectious diseases during the 
period 2010-2011, than those lost to warfare in the same period. As such, the large scale loss of 
                                                          
4 The infectious disease burden is established through health indicators and statistics published by the WHO and its 
associated organisations 
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human life due to infectious disease legitimate public health and its prioritisation as a vital security 
concern for the region. The chapter also explores the unique nature of infectious disease, its 
propensity to spread and the implications this has on regional security. In light of the economic and 
political collapse of Zimbabwe, the contagious nature of infectious disease, the deterioration of the 
public health sector of Zimbabwe and the concurrent mass migration of Zimbabwean nationals into 
the region, Zimbabwe emerges as a unique and novel challenge to the security and stability of the 
region. 
 
Chapter Four employs a case study to substantiate the assertions made by the study, illuminating the 
intricate interplay between public health, human security and regional security in southern Africa.  An 
outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe in 2008 took on a regional scope, resulting in 98,424 reported cases 
and 4,276 deaths in Zimbabwe (WHO, 2009b, p. 1). A further 700 cases were reported in the 
Limpopo province of South Africa (Muthambi, 2009) and WHO received reports from the Ministries 
of Health confirming cholera cases in Palm Tree (Botswana) and Guro district (Mozambique).  At the 
conclusion of the outbreak 636 deaths had been recorded outside Zimbabwe (WHO, 2008, p. 1). The 
public health sector of Zimbabwe, beset with massive shortages in human and financial resources, 
lacked the capacity to manage and contain the cholera cases in the country, and so Zimbabwean 
nationals turned to migration as a last resort to ensure their well-being.  
 
Chapter Five provides an assessment of the ramifications that the Zimbabwe case has had on the 
region and the responses of SADC 5 and the individual states that comprise the SADC region. This is 
achieved by reviewing relevant SADC policy and protocol, the actions of individual states and 
interviews with key actors in the public health sector of Zimbabwe.  
 
It is apparent that infectious diseases pose a significant threat to the region and the case of the public 
health crisis in Zimbabwe details the adverse ramifications that such threats pose to regional security 
and stability. However, SADC and its member states have failed to respond adequately to the vital 
human security concern of infectious disease. The absence of a sound regional response to vital 
human security concerns has in turn raised questions of regional stability and capacity. The study will 
show that characteristics inherent to southern African states stand as impediments to decisive and 
effective action for human security at the regional level. As such, vital human security concerns such 
as infectious disease persist, endangering the region at large.  
 
The study puts forward a two part hypothesis. Firstly, that southern Africa is host to a number of vital 
security concerns, most appropriately characterised under the paradigm of Human Security. Secondly, 
                                                          
5 The premier regional governance institution 
11 
 
the study asserts that if not managed adequately these vital concerns to human security have the 
ability to permeate state borders, having serious ramifications on regional security and stability. It is 
the opinion of this study that it is the nature of the southern African state that lends itself as a source 
of human insecurity, and simultaneously impedes it from effectively confronting the security concerns 
specific to it. By detailing the deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe and its effects on 
the region, this study intends to demonstrate the hypothesis it puts forward. 
 
The last chapter provides a conclusion of the study, summarising the key arguments of the study and 
outlining the human security problematique of southern Africa.  
 
The study employed two key mechanisms of analysis: Key informant interviews and Document 
Reviews.  Key informant interviews tap into the special knowledge of experts on a particular issue(s) 
under study. For the purposes of this study, these experts were high level Zimbabwean public health 
specialists with experience and knowledge about the structure and function of the Zimbabwean public 
health sector, and the challenges it faces. Due to their immense international experience, the selected 
experts also gave insight to the regional aspects of public health within SADC and in southern Africa. 
Secondly, the study reviewed key documents with regard to migration, human security, public health 
and regional humanitarian cooperation. These documents included SADC policies and reports, the 
public health policies of individual SADC states, public health and humanitarian policies and reports 
of international organisations such as the UN, and independent reports and studies conducted by 
research institutions with regards to migration, the health of migrants and public health in southern 
Africa. The purpose of which was to give a critical appraisal of the policies currently in place to 
manage public health in the region and to assess the status of public health in southern Africa.  
.  
 
The nature of southern Africa‟s security problems are complex and are thus not adequately provided 
for by traditional state-centred security agendas. In many instances the state is unable or unwilling to 
respond to human insecurity, or is sometimes itself a contributor to these security threats. The 
resultant insecurity at the individual level requires critical responses that the state alone is unable to 
provide. In addition, due to the absence of military inter-state conflict in the region, employing a 
method of analysis that focuses on state security alone is insufficient.  By viewing southern Africa 
through the lens of Human Security, the nature of the security concerns of the region will become 
apparent.  This study intends to broaden the conception of security in southern Africa to consider not 
only the state, but also the well-being of the individuals within those states as a vital component of 
regional security and stability. 
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Figure 1.1: Research questions and the methods employed to answer them 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q 3. How has the region  responded to these concerns ?
Zimbabwe (National response) SADC (Regional response)
Q 2. How have these concerns affected the region ? 
Case Study – The deterioration of the Public Health Sector of Zimbabwe 
as a threat to regional stability. 
Q 1. What is the nature of the security concerns present in the region? 
Critical Security Studies Human Security 
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Chapter Two – Conceptualising Human Security in Southern Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The period between 1945 and 1989 was characterised by tense relations between the United States 
(US) and the Soviet Union. Chiefly concerned with increasing and strengthening their spheres of 
influence, the US and the Soviet Union largely ignored other international concerns, especially the 
protection of human rights.6 The international arena was dominated by the „politics of alignment‟ as it 
offered states military and economic support and privilege in the international system. States 
considered their obligations to protect human rights and ensure peace only after their responsibility 
towards their communist or capitalist allies. US-Soviet tensions dominated all facets of the 
international system leading to the large scale neglect of pertinent international issues, the paralysis of 
the United Nations and the breach of numerous international laws. 
 
During the Cold War, the US government tolerated and supported many authoritarian, repressive 
regimes simply because the leaders of those regimes were willing to oppose the Soviet Union, 
Syngman Rhee of South Korea, Pinochet of Chile and Mabuto of Zaire stand as stark examples of 
this. For its part, the Soviet Union was equally silent about defects in allied non-communist 
dictatorships, such as Iran under the leadership of Khomeini, and Cuba under the leadership of Castro, 
as long as those regimes were opposed to the US (Richards & Cingranelli, 1999, p. 513). In addition 
the US and the Soviet spurred fatal proxy wars across the globe7 in pursuit of dominance, violating 
numerous international laws and treaties.8 Movements in the Soviet bloc, such as those in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, which called for the freedoms stated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, were ruthlessly crushed (Josika, 2005, p. 1). One of the most potent symbols of Soviet 
commitment to curb individual freedoms was created in 1961: the Berlin Wall (Mews, 1996, p. 50). 
The US CIA financed efforts to overthrow ideologically opposed governments, regardless of whether 
they were democratically elected or not. Actions in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961) are just two 
examples (Robertson, 2006, p. 47). In addition, the US bombing of neutral Cambodia rallied support 
                                                          
6 At this time the human rights discourse was split between two schools of thought: first generation human rights, backed by 
the US and its allies, and second generation human rights favoured by the Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa, and 
Southern Asia. First generation human rights supported individualism in the name of liberty and served to protect the 
individual from excesses of the state. They included, among other things, freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, freedom 
of religion, and voting rights. Second generation human rights supported social justice in the name of equality, and the state 
was the guarantor of these rights. They included the right to be employed, rights to housing and health care, social security 
and unemployment benefits. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provided for all these rights, however the 
USSR abstained from ratifying the document. It is important to note that neither the US nor the Soviet Union honoured the 
type of human rights they claimed to support, as the examples in the text will show.  
7 A total of 21 official wars have been documented. 
8 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948), Geneva Conventions (1949), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976).  
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for the vicious Khmer Rouge regime, which ended with the killing of an estimated 1.7 million 
Cambodians (Kiernan, 1989, p. 12) . 
The thawing of Soviet and US tensions that began in 1985, led to the end of the Cold War and the 
eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
The demise of communism and the end of the Cold War was hailed by Francis Fukuyama as the „end 
of history‟ (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 1)  and by George Bush as the era for a „new world order‟ (Johnson, 
1999, p. 5). Indeed the end of the Cold War was a time filled with contradicting possibilities and 
opportunities. With the world no longer polarised, politicians and commentators alike prophesied the 
birth of a new era in global politics and state relations. The removal of the „iron curtain‟ would enable 
states to operate freely without concerns of alignment (Mews, 1996, p. 50). 
 
This „opening up‟ saw an upgrade in the status of human rights, a discourse that largely lay dormant 
during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War saw the formal development of International 
Humanitarian Law and numerous international treaties were ratified, most notably the 1998 Rome 
Statute which culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), an 
independent judicial body mandated to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
the crime of aggression (Arsanjani, 1999, p. 22).   
 
The last two decades have seen an exponential growth in the discourse of human rights and the 
recognition of the significant role that individual security plays in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Pioneering the protection of such rights, the United Nations, through its various 
organs and agencies has increased its activities specific to the protection of individuals and their vital 
needs.9 The Security Council in turn has passed key resolutions aimed at the protection of the 
individual, most notably Resolution 1674 – the Responsibility to Protect – which sanctions the use of 
force to intervene for humanitarian purposes.  In addition, numerous non-governmental organisations 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been established with the sole mandate 
of ensuring the protection of human rights and advocating against individuals/groups found to be 
violating these rights.  
 
The study of security was particularly open to new interpretations, with authors such as Buzan calling 
for the rethinking of security after the Cold War (Buzan, 1997, p. 5). Traditional perceptions of 
international security were predominantly concerned with inter-state relations and military conflicts.  
                                                          
9 Most notably the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP). 
Together these agencies actively work to ensure the security of numerous facets of human life.  
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The field contemporarily known as Security Studies traditionally functioned in the same space as 
Strategic Studies, binding the analysis of security in direct relation to state politics, military power, 
the mechanisms of war and militarisation. Rarely would issues such as the spread of infectious disease 
or environmental safety be considered as legitimate or immediate security concerns. Therefore the end 
of the Cold War facilitated the broadening of the study of international security to encompass non-
traditional concerns pertaining to the securitisation of human life.  
 
The present academic discourse of security has become increasingly dominated by topics concerning 
human rights and humanitarian initiatives (Buzan, 1983; Sen, 2000; Axworthy, 2001; Alkire, 2003; 
Kaldor, 2006; Booth, 2007). The 21st century has seen the coming to the fore of the prioritisation of 
the security of the individual and the birth of the concept of Human Security. This term was first 
articulated at Forum of African Leadership in 1991, hosted by the Organisation of African Unity and 
the UN. The forum established that the concept of security needed to go beyond considerations of the 
military warfare, and to delve deeper to encompass the security of the individual and his/her needs 
(Hough, 2004, p. 13). 
 
The rationale of Human Security is not new: mankind has since the beginning of time been 
formulating ways to ensure its own safety. Tales of famine, war, drought and plagues have been told 
throughout history, and in each scenario mankind has endeavoured not only to survive but to devise 
strategies to mitigate the effects of future insecurities. On a basic level, this is essentially what human 
security is concerned with: the quality of human life, and its protection from immediate and future 
threats.  
 
Severe threats to human security range from genocide and slavery to natural disasters such as 
hurricanes or floods to massive violations of the right to food, health and housing (Kaldor et al, 2007, 
p. 273). Concerns of this nature, and not military warfare, dominate the security concerns of most 
people, especially in the developing world. As such, the concept of Human Security has great utility 
in characterising the security concerns of developing regions such as southern Africa. This chapter 
explores the concept of Human Security, asserting it as the most appropriate framework for viewing 
southern Africa‟s security concerns.  
 
2.2 The Inadequacy of Conventional Security Studies 
The study of International Relations (IR) began to open up after the end of the Cold War. In addition 
to analysing the interactions between states, it broadened its scope to incorporate the interactions and 
roles of non-state entities, such as inter-governmental organisations, international non-governmental 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational corporations Following this 
trend, human security emerged as a result of the broadening of the agenda of security studies. The 
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apparent divorce between human and state security was evident during the Cold War: the safety of 
individuals, which was once viewed as a key responsibility of the state, had now been placed 
secondary to the safety of the state itself. As such, there was a realisation that the conventional views 
of security needed expansion. On conclusion of the 1945 San Francisco Conference the US Secretary 
of State stated that:  
 
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells 
freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from 
want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace (Alkire, 2003, p. 14).  
 
However, it was only towards the end of the Cold War that there was a development in the literature 
surrounding the meaning of “security” and its definition in this new era. The traditional approach 
employed by neo-realism proved inadequate, as it placed the state as the primary referent and 
guarantor of security, this over-emphasis on the state, its structural and strategic abilities, was not 
reflective of the changing security concerns of the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 1991; Crawford, 1991; 
Haftendorn, 1991; Kolodziej, 1992; Baldwin, 1995; Krause, 1996). The debate surrounding the nature 
and definition of security was rooted in three main concerns: the discontent among some scholars with 
the neorealist foundations that characterised the field, the need to respond to the challenges posed by 
the emergence of a post-Cold War security order, and the strong desire to make the discipline relevant 
to contemporary concerns (Krause, 1996, p. 229). 
 
With particular reference to academia, there are two main contemporary theories of International 
Relations that have contributed to the efforts in re-defining security to incorporate the individual. At 
one end of the continuum is an approach based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, which 
maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of 
(human) security (Naidoo, 2010, p. 2). Some call this approach the „new security thinking‟ 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 14). Secondly, the postmodernist or „critical human security‟ approach, which is 
rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics, is based on a set of assumptions that 
essentially attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, while placing greater 
emphasis on the interdependency and transnationalisation of non-state actors (Naidoo, 2010, p. 
2).This expansion of security analysis requires a departure from Strategic Studies and links the 
analysis of security in direct relation to state politics, and related factors such as geography, 
economics, and military power. Issues surrounding human rights and environmental security feature 
minimally in these considerations.  
 
Scholars have attempted to map the changes that have been made to incorporate these new security 
matters into Security Studies. Emma Rothschild documented these changes in security perceptions 
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and ideas in her book What is Security? (1995) and outlines the four directions in which security has 
moved. Firstly, it has extended downwards from the security of nations to the security of groups and 
individuals. Secondly, it has extended upwards, from the security of nations to the security of the 
international system, or of a supranational physical environment, from the nation to the biosphere. 
The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. Thirdly, 
security has extended horizontally. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and „systems‟) 
cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, 
therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or „human‟ security. Lastly, the 
political responsibility for ensuring security is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from 
national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local 
government, and sideways to non-governmental organisations, to public opinion and the press, and to 
the abstract forces of nature or of the market (Rothschild, 1995, p. 55). This articulation of the shifts 
in perceptions of security positions Human Security as a direct result of these various changes in 
security agendas. 
 
As articulated by Krause, the re-definition of security was rooted in a strong desire to make the 
discipline relevant to contemporary concerns (Krause, 1996, p. 229). Thus Human Security emanates 
mainly from the realisation that conventional perceptions of security do not adequately articulate the 
security needs of the globe.  Orthodox perceptions of security are state-focused and based on classic 
realist/neo-realist conceptions of international order, sovereignty and territoriality. Such conceptions 
place the state as the primary actor within international politics. However, when viewed in relation to 
the evolution of international politics, these realist assertions no longer hold water. In addition to the 
state, contemporary international politics include non-state actors such as global governance 
organisations, multi-national companies, non-governmental organisations, special interest groups and 
individuals. The emergence of these new international players has been followed by an emergence of 
new security concerns in the international arena. In addition to military threats from other states, 
international peace and security is also threatened by terrorism, cyber criminals, ethnic and  religious 
tensions, famine, poverty and climate change, to name a few. The framework offered by conventional 
Security Studies, that focuses on state security and military defence, can no longer ensure 
international security and stability.  
 
Take for instance, the US „War on Terror‟, it has not delivered the expected results as prescribed by 
realism. The United States government launched a military war in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
response to a terrorist attack that claimed 2,996 lives on September 11 2001, orchestrated by a non-
state Islamic group: al-Qaeda (Glazier, 2008, p. 1). This war was launched in pursuit of national and 
international security. To date no substantial progress has been made in disabling al-Qaeda, which 
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reportedly operates out of forty countries, even after losing its leader, Osama bin Laden, while the 
effects of the war on the US have been negative. An approximate 6,000 US soldiers have died in the 
war and 550,000 have been injured. The state has spent between $3.2-$4 trillion on the war, almost 
seven times more than it spent on education in 2011 (Watson Institute, 2011). There is no measurable 
indicator to suggest that the „War on Terror‟ has increased US state security or international security. 
Aptly expressed by Lal:  “the traditional neo-realist notion of national security is paradoxical, 
epistemologically flawed and ontologically unstable...and produces more insecurity than security” 
(Lal, 2006, p. 2). 
 
In response to the inadequacies of traditional Security Studies, theorists such as Booth, Krause, Vale 
and Williams have submitted an essential critique of state-focused security perceptions, and contend 
that the study of security should focus on the individual and individual emancipation rather than on 
the states. Critical Security Studies, the result of their work, asserts that individuals, not states should 
be the referent objects of security analyses, that political realism fails to offer either a satisfactory 
theory or practice of security, and that systems of security based on the insecurity of others are 
unsustainable (Zamarcozy, 2007, p. 1).  Critical Security Studies asserts that, instead of an over-
emphasis on the state, security should be centred on the individual and human emancipation. There 
are three key reasons for a specific focus on the individual: 
 
A. The divorce between state security and individual security  
 
Traditionally „security‟ was perceived as the security of the state (Mutimer, 2008, p. 34). This gave 
rise to the assumption that threats to security arose from outside the state and that these threats were 
primarily if not always military in nature (Ayoob, 1991, p. 261).  This traditional view did not ignore 
the need for the protection of individuals, rather it saw national security as equivalent to individual 
security. This arose from John Locke‟s conception of the social contract, in which the state was 
orientated toward the individuals who constituted it. The foundations of the state were set on the 
consent of the people and the state was conceived as a functionary of the people. Accordingly the 
security of the state was a direct reflection of the security of the individuals within that state. As the 
state and society became increasingly indistinguishable, the security of the individual was irrevocably 
connected to that of the state (Buzan, 1983, p. 21).  
 
However, Buzan theorised that there is a phenomenon where the state has two faces. The first is 
minimal in nature: it perceives itself as a sum of its parts, as described above, and its purpose is to 
fulfil the needs of the people. The second has a maximal nature, in which the state is viewed to be 
more than a sum of its parts, that is, the state and the people are two separate entities and thus have 
separate priorities and interests (Buzan, 1983, p. 22). In this context, it is possible for a state to ignore 
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or antagonise the security needs of its people, or to pursue projects that are detrimental to the security 
of its people (Buzan, 1983, p. 24).   
 
Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, state-ordered violent attacks on political opposition parties 
during the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe and Kenya and the recent violent repression of homosexuals 
in Uganda are testament to the apparent divorce between state security and individual security, caused 
by the maximal nature of the state, The security of the individual, once safeguarded by the state 
according to the dictates of the social contract, can no longer be guaranteed. It is due to this divorce 
that a specific focus on the security of the individual is necessary. 
 
B. Changes in the sources and targets of security threats in the post-Cold War era 
 
In her book New and Old Wars (2006) Kaldor postulates the changing nature of war and conflict after 
1989 and asserts that a new nature of war has emerged, one that is decreasingly characterised by 
military conflicts between states and increasingly by threats that emanate from within the state itself. 
She has coined the post-Cold War era as the age of the „new war‟ (Kaldor, 2006, p. 1). In addition, 
she notes that the source of these conflicts and the targets of these conflicts have changed. Individuals, 
rather than the state, are increasingly the targets of security threats, and these individuals are now 
under threat from external non-state actors, such as terrorists, drug cartels and cyber criminals. The 
Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, a religious-based rebel movement, has killed and 
abducted citizens, mostly children,  from Uganda, Sudan, the Central African Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo since its inception in 1987 (Doom & Vlasenroot, 1999, p. 5). The 
LRA has no intention of challenging or toppling the governments of these states, the target of their 
attacks is the citizens of these states. These attacks fully exemplify the rise of the phenomenon where 
security threats emanate from non-state forces targeted at the individual rather than the state. This 
change in the nature of conflict requires a specific focus on the security of the individual. 
 
C.  The nature of threats to security in the post-Cold War era 
 
Finally, the concept of human security is particularly significant when one confronts the myriad of 
new and re-emerging threats to international peace and security, and the effects these threats have on 
human life. At the simplest level, populations must be protected from natural disasters and war. 
However, hazards to human life are not limited to these two areas: individuals are susceptible to 
various, but equally significant dangers.  One of the fastest-growing threats to human life is the 
inaccessibility of food. Estimates indicate that some 840 million people were undernourished in 
1998–2000; 11 million in the industrialised countries, 30 million in countries in transition, and 799 
million in the developing world. A 2003 estimate showed 24,000 dying from hunger daily in Africa 
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(Clover, 2003, p. 6). In addition to deaths caused by hunger, there are increased fatalities caused by 
infectious diseases. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoeal diseases are the 
leading infectious diseases in developing countries. Malaria kills 7,000 Africans every day 
(approximately 2.5 million a year), and is the leading cause of death for children under five years of 
age (Green, 2003, p. 6). The World Health Organisation estimated that between 2000 and 2020, 
nearly one billion people would be newly infected with tuberculosis, 200 million would get sick, and 
35 million would die. The largest killer is HIV/AIDS, whose death toll in 2002 was over 20 million in 
Africa alone (Green, 2003, p. 2). Efforts to curb this epidemic have been moderately successful: 34 
million people were living with HIV worldwide in 2011, and over 75 percent of these cases were in 
sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2011, p. 12). The effects of such threats are experienced at the 
individual level. When compared to a military attack targeted at the political apparatus of a state, it is 
logical to deduce that these types of threats target the individual rather than the state. 
 
The globalisation of the world – the widespread operation of businesses on a global rather than a 
national level and the ease with which individuals and groups can communicate and organize across 
national frontiers – has facilitated the creation of a global village where borders have become 
increasingly become porous (Ripsman & Paul, 2010, p. 8).  This development has transformed the 
traditional role of the state, giving it less control over its borders and the whereabouts of its citizens. 
As such, the state can no longer guarantee the safety of all its citizens premised on traditional theories 
of territoriality. For example, the outbreak of Avian Flu (H5N1) in 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in the same year, and Swine Flu (H1N1) in 2009, exacerbated the state system. 
Previously such health risks could be managed through national containment and concentrated 
national initiatives for treatment. However, due to the porous nature of borders and the advances of 
modern transport, these health risks could not be managed with the same methods. The nature of these 
threats cannot be restricted by conventional techniques: unlike military attacks, diseases cannot be 
thwarted by increased military spending or the establishment of strategic global alliances.  The advent 
of globalisation and technology and the creation of a global village mean nuanced threats such as 
climate change, piracy, terrorism and the proliferation of biological weapons have the potential to 
affect the globe at large. Thus the last reason for a specific focus on the security of the individual is 
the new nature of the threats present in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Southern Africa and Conventional Security Studies 
It is apparent that the international arena and the nature of conflict have changed in the 21st century 
and human security contests any conception of security that denies this reality. This is not to say that 
human security is in complete conflict with traditional conceptions of security: human security 
acknowledges that the state should be the primary guarantor of security. In an ideal setting the tenets 
of human security should complement rather than contend with the state. However, in instances where 
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the state is oblivious of or complicit in the insecurity of its citizens, human security stands in conflict 
with conventional security which privileges „high politics‟ over the individual and leaves conflicts 
that occur within the boundaries of a sovereign state as the responsibility of that state alone. 
International security, traditionally defined as territorial integrity, does not necessarily correlate with 
the true security needs of the globe, and an over-emphasis on state security can be to the detriment of 
human welfare needs (Newman, 2010, p. 7). It therefore asserts that the security of the individual 
should be placed on a par with that of the state, and when states antagonise the safety of their citizens, 
it is the security of the citizens that should take precedence and not the sovereignty of the state. What 
becomes apparent here is that there is a strong tension between human security and state sovereignty, 
between earmarking the individual as the key unit of analysis and retaining the state as the central 
actor or referent within the human security paradigm (Thomas & Tow, 2002, p. 181). This tension is 
essential in understanding the security problematique of southern Africa and will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Five. 
Looking through the lens of conventional security studies it would seem that southern Africa is a 
peaceful and secure region. There are no interstate wars and the political independence and territory 
of each state remains intact and free from threat. Although there are military struggles present (DRC), 
these are contained within the borders of that state and are therefore considered as internal conflicts, 
to be handled as an internal matter by that sovereign state.  
 
However, if the same region is viewed through the lens of Human Security a distinctly different 
analysis would be made.  It becomes apparent that there are a myriad of security concerns present in 
the region, ranging from the unavailability of food, poverty, disease, racial, ethnic and religious 
tensions, political oppression, state-orchestrated violence, gender-based violence and environmental 
degradation. Some of these security concerns have the ability to affect both state and regional security 
and stability.  
 
This study asserts that the lens of conventional security studies incorrectly portrays the region as 
stable and secure due to its realist, state-focused prescriptions. The Critical Security Studies‟ Human 
Security paradigm more appropriately sheds light on the real security concerns of the region and their 
effects. The study therefore posits Human Security as the lens through which southern Africa‟s 
security concerns should be analysed.  The following sections will detail the concept of Human 
Security so as to correctly characterise the security problematique of southern Africa.  
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2.3 The Concept of Human Security 
The concept of Human Security is highly contested. With some authors advocating for a broad 
approach which considers all threats to human integrity, including issues of underdevelopment, 
poverty and deprivation (Commission on Human Security, 2003; Thakur and Newman, 2004; 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006). Other opt for a more narrow approach which focuses on the human 
consequences of armed conflict and the dangers posed to civilians by repressive governments and 
situations of state failure (Ayoob, 1995; Thomas and Wilkin, 1999; Mack, 2004; Kaldor, 2006; 
MacFarlane and Khong, 2006; Booth, 2007). Critics of the broad approach argue that it “sacrifices 
analytical precision in favour of general normative persuasion” which limits its applicability for 
policy makers (Newman, 2010, p. 8). However, to limit human security to the analysis of the effects 
of war alone negates the plethora of insecurities emanating from other sources.  There are numerous 
definitions of Human Security, some focusing on tangible physical threats to human life whose impact 
can be measured (King and Murray, 2001, 2002; Thakur and Newman 2004; Mack, 2005) and some 
that are non-material, embracing intangible values such as sense of well-being and human dignity 
(Commission on Human Security, 2003). 
 
Due to its complexity several questions have emerged with regard to the definition of Human 
Security, that is, the nature, qualities, and boundaries of human security as a concept. To this end this 
section will endeavour to explore the various definitions of human security and their accompanying 
features in order to tease out a definition of Human Security that appropriately characterises the 
security problematique of southern Africa. 
 
Defining Human Security 
The definitional debate will begin with the work of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and their seminal publication, The 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security 
drafted and championed by Mahbubul Haq (Rothschild, 1995, p. 53). This report was crafted for the 
Copenhagen Social Summit, and spoke to the heart of the security needs of the decade. It asserted that 
rather than fear of external military attack, people had more pressing security concerns:  Will they and 
their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be 
safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become victims of violence 
because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? The report 
famously asserted that “Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human 
life and dignity” (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).   
 
The report identified four central features of human security: human security is a universal concern, 
relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor; the components of human security are 
interdependent; human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention, 
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and is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream; Human security is people-centred, 
and concerned with how people live and the quality of their lives. The report correctly states that 
human security is better identified by its absence rather than its presence. Human Security is thus 
defined as safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in 
communities (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). This definition was designed to relate to the seven dimensions of 
human security: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. 
Since this report the UNDP has been heralded as the premier international organisation with regard to 
human development and human security. Their annual Human Development Reports give the most 
expansive and recognised information on various concerns ranging from HIV/AIDS rates to levels of 
literacy. The UNDP has developed the Human Development Index (HDI) as a statistical measure to 
compare and gauge levels of development across the globe. 
 
The work of the UNDP is the foundation upon which many authors have based their definitions of 
human security. These definitions have been labelled as broad, as they seek to include all threats to 
human life. Following this broad approach to human security Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary 
General, defined Human Security in his 2000 report We the Peoples of the World: 
 
Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It 
encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each 
individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is 
also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from 
want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – 
these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national security (Annan, 2000, p. 8). 
 
This definition advocates for the recognition of all threats to human life as legitimate security threats. 
This view is also shared by Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, who 
asserts that: 
Human security today puts people first and recognises that their safety is integral to the promotion and 
maintenance of international peace and security...no longer are we limited to discussions of states‟ rights 
and national sovereignty. Protecting civilians, addressing the plight of war-affected children and the 
threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open borders and combating infectious are now part of the 
dialogue (Axworthy, 2001, p. 20).  
 
By tracing the distinct roots of human security – in human rights, in sustainable development, and in 
safety of the peoples, Hampson et al. (2002) call for the definition of security to be broadened to: “the 
absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of 
the individual.” Their view includes other core values: physical security, and the protection of basic 
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liberties such as freedom of speech, economic needs and interests. This narrative of the protection of 
„core human values‟ is shared by Alkire (2003) and Ramesh Thakur of the United Nations University 
(UNU). The UNU hold that: 
 
Human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical and life-threatening dangers, 
regardless of whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they lie 
within or outside states, and whether they are direct or structural. It is „human centred‟ in that its 
principal focus is on people both as individuals and as communal groups. It is „security oriented‟ in that 
the focus is on freedom from fear, danger and threat (Thakur, 2004, p. 347). 
 
As shown by the UNDP‟s work, Human Security and Human Development share the same theoretical 
space. As such, Leaning and Arie developed a human security approach based on human 
development, with specific reference to Africa. Their definition emphasises the psychological and 
non-material aspects of security. According to them human security is: 
 
An underlying condition for sustainable human development. It results from the social, psychological, 
economic, and political aspects of human life that in times of acute crisis or chronic deprivation protect 
the survival of individuals, support individual and group capacities to attain minimally adequate 
standards of living, and promote constructive group attachment and continuity through time (Leaning & 
Arie, 2000). 
 
Caroline Thomas formulated a definition of human security that is reflective of the contemporary age 
of globalisation. She outlines how globalisation is increasing inequality and the inadequacy of the 
existing international organisations to address these inequalities, and says: 
 
Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which 
human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while 
material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material 
dimensions to form a qualitative whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive 
notion of democracy, and is directly engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local 
to the global (Thomas, 2001, p. 161). 
 
The above definitions all favour the broad, all-inclusive conception of human security. A number of 
authors have criticised this conceptualisation of human security. Edward Newman describes human 
security as “normatively attractive, but analytically weak” (Newman, 2010, p. 11). It classifies all and 
any hazard to human life as „threat‟ and as such loses any real meaning or analytical significance. In 
reality, the threats to human life are so far-reaching that even the most skilled policy maker would be 
perplexed, at the least, if tasked with assembling a coherent proposal to apply to human security, as it 
is broadly defined. With no markers for measurement or guidelines as to which threats to prioritise, 
25 
 
the broad definition of human security is justly critiqued for its amorphous nature. As Keith Krause 
argues: 
 
The broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping 
the label of human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link, and at a certain point, 
human security becomes a loose synonym for “bad things that can happen.” At this point, it loses all 
utility to policymakers – and incidentally to analysts – since it does not allow us to see what is distinctive 
about the idea of “security” (Krause, 2004, p. 44). 
 
Other opponents to this broad definition echo this same narrative. Mack argues that “conflating a very 
broad range of disparate harms under the rubric of „insecurity‟ is an exercise in re-labelling that serves 
no apparent analytic purpose” (2004, p. 49). MacFarlane and Khong argue that the “conceptual 
overstretch” of the broad definition of human security makes it “meaningless and analytically useless” 
(2006, p. 237, 247).  MacFarlane and Khong (2006, p. 17) also deny that rebranding development, the 
environment or health as security challenges has produced a greater flow of resources to addressing 
them. They argue that this re-labelling actually adds confusion to the field, and distracts from other 
pressing security concerns.  
 
The above contestations to Human Security are legitimate. However, if it is agreed that the individual 
is the “irreducible base unit” of security (Buzan, 1991, p. 35) what becomes apparent is that although 
these definitional debates do exist, at the core they all recognise the validity of placing the individual, 
and not the state, at the centre of security analysis.  This shared ideal provides a foundation to bridge a 
compromise between the broad and narrow approaches. To this end, scholars have attempted to 
characterise human security in a way that is complementary to both opinions.  
 
In support of, and drawing from the work done by both the UNDP and the Canadian Government on 
the topic, Kanti Bajpai presented a paper inclusive of the positive elements of human security. He 
asserts that contrary to the opinions of some critics, who say the concept is too woolly and broad to be 
useful either analytically or practically, “the idea of human security can be clearly delineated in 
relation to the dominant, neo-realist conception of security10 and that its elements can be presented 
compactly enough for further refinement”11 (Bajpai, 2000, p. 2). He proposes that human security can 
be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. To do this there are two key components to 
consider: direct and indirect threats to individual bodily safety and freedom and the capacity to deal 
                                                          
10 As suggested by Buzan (1991), human security can be approached from a neo-realist perspective that retains the sovereign 
state as the chief guarantor of security, but extends security agendas to include political, economic, social and environmental 
threats, while also considering traditional military threats. This analysis is examined from three perspectives: the 
international system, the state, and the individual. 
11 Mapping human security in relation to neo-realism addresses critiques of its theoretical ambiguity, as it can clearly be 
traced back to an established IR theoretical framework. Presenting it compactly serves to streamline its analysis, creating 
clear boundaries for policy makers and analysts. 
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with threats, namely, the fostering of norms, institutions, and democratisation/representativeness in 
decision-making structures. Thus an audit of human security would consist of (i) an accounting of the 
growth or decline in threats (quantitative) and (ii) an estimate of the capabilities to meet those threats 
(qualitative). The construction of a Human Security Index (HSI), a quantitative measure, similar to 
the Human Development Index used to measure levels of development, would allow for cross-
national and intra-national comparisons of threats to human security. Secondly, those factors that are 
not susceptible to measurement can be assessed qualitatively; these factors are generally at the 
international/global level, such as policies and resolutions passed to deal with specific threats. What 
Bajpai suggests is that, in addition to the comparison of numbers of woman and children involved in 
trafficking on an annual basis, there should be an analysis of the international, intergovernmental and 
governmental policies with direct regard to trafficking (Bajpai, 2000, p. 55).  
 
Also in the effort of making the concept more palatable for practical application, King and Murray 
have formulated a definition of human security with boundaries.  They define an individual's human 
security as his or her expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalised poverty 
(King & Murray, 2002, p. 592). They have identified five domains of well-being: health, education, 
income, political freedom, and democracy. Thus generalised poverty is based on falling below critical 
thresholds in any of these domains of well-being. They propose an index of human security that 
includes “only those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to 
fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk” (King & Murray, 2002, p. 593). Their index 
sets thresholds in each domain that are in some sense absolute; the index would identify a person as 
insecure if he or she fell below a threshold in any of the domains. Their approach does not include 
violence, but rather focuses on issues associated with the „freedom from want‟ (Alkire, 2003, p. 15). 
 
Contributing further to this conceptualisation of a threshold based definition, Owen (2004) points out 
that: 
 
A principle critique of traditional security is that it inappropriately limits what are and are not legitimate 
threats. However, by artificially choosing which of the UNDP categories are and are not relevant, most 
human security proponents are guilty of the same reductionism. Threats should be included not because 
they fall into a particular category, such as violence, but because of their actual severity. In this 
conception, human security is not defined by an arbitrary list (either broad or narrow), but by the threats 
actually affecting people (Owen, 2004, p. 382).  
 
Owen puts forward a hybrid definition that would not pre-choose threats but rather include them 
based on their severity. That is, all concerns would be considered but only those that pass a specific 
threshold of severity would be labelled as a threat to human security. The threshold would be based 
on two factors: it must be selective without being limiting, and it must have clear categories into 
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which threats may fall for analytical purposes. He therefore defines human security as the protection 
of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, 
personal and political threats (Owen, 2004, p. 383). In his opinion this definition accommodates both 
narrow and broad conceptions of human security and includes all human security concerns but sets 
out clear categories into which these threats may fall into,. It is this definition that the study will use 
when analysing the security concerns of southern Africa.  
 
It is clear from this analysis that there are many divergent views of what the concept of Human 
Security entails. While some authors vie for the broad conception of human security which 
accommodates all threats to human life, others contend that this view is too extensive and impedes the 
pragmatic application of the concept as a policy and an analytical tool. To remedy this some authors 
have sought to negotiate a conception that encompasses both views, by suggesting the use of 
thresholds and indices to measure human security, while including all threats. This debate, however, 
takes place against the backdrop of a widespread consensus that the analysis of security must 
encompass the individual. Aptly summarised by Hubert (2001), although the debate may at first 
appear polarised (narrow vs. broad), there is in fact significant convergence among proponents. 
Hubert asserts that the differences observed in this debate are not of substance but of packaging. The 
fundamental focus of Human Security is the security of the individual.  
 
The definition put forward by Owen (2004) best articulates the nature of the security concerns specific 
to the southern African sub-continent, and  therefore for the purposes of this study:  Human security is 
the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, 
economic, food, health, personal and political threats (Owen, 2004, p. 383).  
 
As pointed out by Owen (2004), by arbitrarily selecting security threats analysts and policy makers 
run the risk of excluding real threats on the basis that they do not fit into specific categories. Rather a 
threshold should be established by which the vitality of each threat is assessed; placing those threats 
most vital to human life at a higher priority than those which are less vital. This establishes a 
hierarchy of threats which allows for clearer and more strategic policy responses. In addition, this 
definition speaks to the nature of the security threats in southern Africa, that is they are critical 
(threatening the very life of individuals) and/or pervasive (persistent, with the tendency to 
permeate/spread).  
 
Considering the areas covered by the chosen definition – the spread of infectious diseases emerge as 
the most vital human security threat in the region. The provision of public health is therefore a vital 
human security concern, that is, it is essential for the continued existence of human life. While SADC 
reports that a total of 2.9 million people in the region were food insecure at the end of 2011 (SADC, 
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2011, p. 6), an astounding 11.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in the same period. Of the 
23.3 million people living with HIV in Africa, southern Africa accounts for 49 percent of these cases 
(USAID, 2011, p. 1).  In addition southern Africa has the highest burden of tuberculosis and 
subsequently the lowest life expectancies in the world.  Infectious diseases in southern Africa are the 
most critical concern to human security, they claim more lives than any other concern, and therefore 
the concern of health in the region is the focus of this study.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is apparent from this analysis that human security is a complex concept. However, at the core, the 
objective of human security is simple: to ensure the safety of human life. Definitions of human 
security oscillate between two key standpoints: the broad conception, most famously promulgated by 
the UNDP and its 1994 Human Development Report, calling for the securitisation of every aspect of 
human life; and narrower definitions that seek to prioritise some threats over others, so as to enhance 
the analytical and practical relevance of the concept. Both these conceptions vary in their 
interpretation of human security, but agree on the fundamental need to place the individual as the key 
referent of security analysis and practice.  For the purposes of this study Human Security has been 
defined as the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive 
environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats (Owen, 2004, p. 383) . This 
definition best suits the security concerns of southern Africa. 
 
Conventional Security Studies would not consider issues of disease, famine, crime, ethnic and 
religious persecution, gender violence or environmental degradation as relevant to international peace 
and security. However, as asserted through Critical Security Studies, it is these very issues that are of 
more relevance in the world today than interstate conflicts and military attacks. This is especially true 
in southern Africa, where the largest killer is disease rather than military warfare. The absence of 
inter-state warfare in southern Africa is not an indication of regional security, as the following chapter 
details. Southern Africa faces significant security concerns, the most vital of which is the spread of 
infectious disease.  
 
The following chapters detail the significance of this threat, and its ramifications on regional security 
and stability.   
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Chapter Three – Public Health in Southern Africa 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was established that conventional security analysis, predicated on strategic 
studies, would consider the southern African region as largely secure and stable due to the absence of 
military conflict. However, when this same analysis is made through the lens of human security, a 
different narrative would be presented. Human security is defined as the protection of the vital core of 
all human lives from critical and pervasive threats, and this study asserts that southern Africa is host 
to significant security concerns, most adequately characterised as threats to human security.  
 
Public health is one such concern, and is at present the most vital concern to human security in the 
region. The WHO defines public health as all organised collective, public or private measures whose 
objective is to prevent disease, promote health and prolong the life of entire populations (WHO, 2007, 
p. 3). It is also the term used to describe the overall state of health of the population in a specific 
location. For the purposes of this study „public health‟ will be used to as a measure of the health of a 
society as well as the abovementioned efforts whose aim is to prevent the spread of disease, 
specifically infectious diseases such as HIV and TB.  Due to the negative consequences that infectious 
diseases have on the quality of life and life itself, the area of public health has received much attention 
as a legitimate challenge to many facets of security, including human security (Brockington, 1985; 
Peterson, 2002; Bower & Chalk, 2003; Thomas & Weber, 2004; Youde, 2005; Callabero-Anthony, 
2006; Elbe, 2006; O‟Manique, 2006; Filder, 2007; MacLean, 2007, 2008). Its negative effects are 
most easily established through quantitative measures, of which mortality rates are the clearest 
indicator. The purpose of this section is therefore to characterise public health as a vital human 
security concern in southern Africa. By giving an overview of the disease burden present in the region 
and the mortality rates due to various diseases it will become apparent that infectious diseases not 
only pose a significant threat to human life, but they claim more lives than civil conflicts, starvation or 
violent crime in the whole region. Recent WHO and UN statistics confirm the immense disease 
burden present in southern Africa. The region accounts for 33 percent of the whole globe‟s HIV 
incidence and 47 percent of HIV/AIDS related morbidity (UNAIDS, 2011).  Other infectious diseases 
such as TB and malaria have high incidence levels, and an analysis of the causes of death in southern 
African states show that infectious diseases,  not crime or military conflict or political violence, 
account for over 50 percent of deaths in the region. The large scale loss of human life due to 
infectious disease legitimate public health and its protection as a vital security concern for the region.  
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This study further asserts that if not managed adequately specific concerns to human security have the 
ability to permeate state borders and affect regional stability. Threats of this nature require regional 
attention if the state involved lacks the political will, policy or resources to manage the threat on its 
own. This analysis aims to situate the public health crisis in Zimbabwe as a concern to the region. The 
disease burden of Zimbabwe ranks amongst the highest in the region, and the enduring political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe has crippled the state, eroding its ability to adequately meet the welfare 
needs of its citizens. This has led to the mass migration of Zimbabwean nationals throughout the 
region. The deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe coupled with the extreme disease 
burden in the region presents a significant concern to regional security and stability.  Due to intra-
regional human mobility and the trade routes linking all SADC countries, the spread of infectious 
disease presents a case of interdependence requiring regional cooperation as the transnational nature 
of disease cannot be contained by state borders.  The situation in Zimbabwe gives credence to the idea 
that unmet individual needs have the ability to destabilise a state and affect the region, the case of 
public health in Zimbabwe presents such a case in southern Africa. 
 
This section serves as a precursor to the main case study, giving an overview of the disease burden of 
the region, and the vital threat that infectious diseases pose to human security in southern Africa.  
 
 
3.2 The Disease Burden of Southern Africa 
A 2009 report on public health in Africa published by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) outlined that although sub-Saharan Africa was host to only 13 percent of the world‟s 
population it carried 24 percent of the global disease burden (Cooke, 2009, p. 1): a disproportionate 
amount when compared to the rest of the world and to equally less developed regions. The World 
Health Organisation (WHO) has further supported these claims: through various reports on 
HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, 12 it can be seen that indeed the acute challenges posed by 
global public health and the spread of disease in the 21st century have been most heavily felt in the 
African continent. The direct effects of poor public health are easily determined by mortality rates; 
however, the subsequent negative consequences are far-reaching, leading to social, economic and 
political instability across the continent. The continent‟s immense disease burden and weak health 
systems are imbedded in a broader context of poverty, underdevelopment and inadequately managed 
government institutions, which are further weakened due to the crippling effects of widespread 
disease.  
 
                                                          
12 The various status reports on global health trends can be accessed via the WHO website: http://www.who.int/en/. 
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Although the region faces health concerns of various types,13 infectious diseases constitute the 
majority of the cases, and of these HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, known as the “big three”, are 
the highest causes of mortality on the continent. Of the regions in the continent the southern African 
sub-continent is host to the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In addition, due to poor 
water and sanitation systems, diarrhoeal diseases such as cholera, typhoid and dysentery also pose a 
major threat to public health in the region.  Although the southern African region is host to other 
security and development concerns, the top cause of mortality in the region is infectious disease 
(Cooke, 2009, p. 7).  
 
HIV/AIDS 
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a sexually transmitted infectious disease that 
compromises the immune system of its host. When fully matured, HIV develops into the Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) which further compromises the immune system, a person 
infected with AIDS is susceptible to numerous infections, known as opportunistic infections, which 
eventually overwhelm the immune system leading to death (Inungu, 2006, p. 17).  The global 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has received an unprecedented amount of attention and funding. It has generated 
new global institutions such as UNAIDS, a UN institution solely focused on the prevention and 
management of the epidemic, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. It has mobilised new players in the 
international arena: religious organisations, private organisations and corporations, and elevated the 
profile of Africa and global public health among states, foreign policy experts, scholars and NGOs 
(Cooke, 2009, p. 1). The response to HIV/AIDS is the largest collective effort in the 21st century. 
Much of the focus of these initiatives is in Africa. To date an estimated total of 30 million people have 
died of HIV/AIDS worldwide, with 68 percent of these from sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa is 
the epicentre of this epidemic: of the 23.3 million people presently living with HIV in Africa, 
southern Africa accounts for 49 percent of these cases, translating to approximately 11.3 million 
people (USAID, 2011, p. 1).  The disease is most prevalent in young adults between the ages of 15-25 
and is the chief cause of low life expectancy, high child mortality and adult mortality rates in the 
region. Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show the prevalence and effects of HIV/AIDS in southern Africa. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Communicable and non-communicable diseases, mental health conditions and disabilities. 
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Country HIV/AIDS 
Prevalence 
(%)14 
World Rank 
(HIV 
Prevalence)15 
Life 
Expectancy16 
World Rank 
(Life 
expectancy)17 
Angola  2.00  30 38.20 190 
Botswana  24.80  2 61.85 146 
DRC   3.40  16 46.50 162 
Lesotho  23.60  3 40.38 188 
Malawi  11.00  9 43.82 183 
Mozambique  11.50  8 41.18 187 
Namibia  13.10  7 52.90 172 
South Africa  17.80  4 48.98 176 
Swaziland  25.90  1 31.88 191 
Tanzania 5.60  12 52.01 170 
Zambia  13.50  6 38.63 189 
Zimbabwe   14.30 5 45.77 180 
 
Table 3.1: HIV/AIDS and Life Expectancy Data for Southern Africa (2011) 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Mortality due to HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa (2011)18 
The effects of HIV/AIDS have been devastating to southern African demographics: reducing life 
expectancy, increasing mortality, lowering fertility, and leaving millions of orphans and vulnerable 
children as a result.   Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe have the highest 
HIV prevalence rates in the world, and subsequently the lowest life expectancies (UN, 2011).  
                                                          
14Source:  WHO, Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic Report 2011. 
15 Rank established by CIA World Fact Book (1 denoting highest adult HIV prevalence in the world). 
16 Source: UN World Population Prospects: 2011. 
17 Rank established by UN Population Division, of 191 member states that submitted data for 2011 (1 denoting lowest life 
expectancy in the world). 
18Source:  WHO, Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic Report 2011 
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When compared with the rest of the world, southern Africa‟s 12 states fare badly against the 
remaining 239 sovereign states. Southern Africa accounts for 33 percent of the world‟s HIV adult 
incidence. The WHO estimated that 34 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in 2011, 11.3 
million of these resided in southern Africa, the remaining 22.7 million in the rest of the world.  
Southern Africa also accounted for a disproportionate amount of the worlds HIV deaths in 2011: 47 
percent. An approximate 1.8 million people died of HIV-related causes in 2011, 846,000 in southern 
Africa, the remaining 945,000 in the rest of the world.  
 
Figure 3.2: HIV Incidence 2011                                        Figure 3.3: HIV Mortality 201119 
 
Tuberculosis (TB) 
Tuberculosis is a common, and in many cases lethal, infectious disease caused by various strains of 
mycobacterium, usually Mycobacterium tuberculosis. It is an air borne disease that typically affects 
the lungs but can also affect other parts of the body. In 2010, 8.8 million people fell ill with TB and 
1.4 million died from TB. Over 95% of TB deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, and it 
is among the top three causes of death for women aged 15 to 44 (WHO, 2012, p. 1). 
 
South Africa and Swaziland have the highest TB rates in the world, with South Africa reporting 981 
cases per 100,000 people and Swaziland 1,287 per 100,000 people (WHO, 2011, p. 1). In addition 
southern Africa has high levels of multi-drug-resistant TB (MDR-TB), a version of the disease that is 
immune to treatment. The spread of TB is exacerbated by the HIV epidemic: it is the most common 
opportunistic disease present in people living with HIV/AIDS and TB-related deaths are the most 
prevalent. Southern Africa has the highest number of people co-infected with TB and HIV in the 
world, and has the highest TB-HIV mortality rates.  
 
                                                          
19 Data for both pie charts calculated from WHO, Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic Report 2011 
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Country TB Prevalence    
(# per 100,00 
people)  
% Co-
infection 
with HIV 
Mortality 
(excluding 
HIV) 
Angola   304 28  6,500 
Botswana   503 65  430 
DRC    327 18  34,000 
Lesotho   633 77  290 
Malawi   219 63  1,700 
Mozambique   544 61  11,000 
Namibia   603 55  580 
South Africa   981 60  25,000 
Swaziland   1,287 82  380 
Tanzania  177 38  5,800 
Zambia   462 65  2,600 
Zimbabwe    633 75  3,400 
 
Table 3.2 TB Data for Southern Africa (2011)20 
 
 
Figure 3.4: TB Co-infection Data for Southern Africa – 201121 
 
 
 
                                                          
20Source:  WHO, Tuberculosis country profiles (2011) 
21 Data calculated from WHO, Tuberculosis country profiles (2011) and the WHO, Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic Report 2011 
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Malaria and Diarrhoeal Diseases  
HIV/AIDS and TB constitute the largest disease burden in Southern Africa, however, populations are 
also affected by malaria and diarrhoeal diseases.  
 
Malaria is an infectious disease caused by a parasite called Plasmodium which is transmitted via the 
bites of infected mosquitoes. The disease affects the blood cells of its host, stopping the supply of 
blood to vital organs which eventually leads to death if untreated (Warrell, 1990, p. 68). Africa 
accounts for 85 percent of malaria cases and 90 percent of malaria deaths worldwide. Sadly, 85 
percent of malaria deaths occur in children under five years of age. The WHO estimates that every 30 
seconds a child dies from malaria in the world. Within southern Africa Angola, DRC, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe are classified as high risk malaria areas by 
the WHO. The most affected are Angola, Malawi and Tanzania, which reported 8,114, 8,206 and 15, 
819 deaths due to malaria respectively in 2011 (WHO, 2011b). 
  
Diarrhoeal diseases such as cholera, typhoid and dysentery are common in underdeveloped and rural 
areas in the region with inadequate water and sanitation facilities. Cholera cases have been reported 
across southern Africa since 2005, the most severe having been in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 
Mozambique in 2010.  
In comparison to other threats to human life – war, starvation or violent crime – infectious disease is 
the highest killer. In addition, other health-related causes of death constitute the majority of deaths 
other than infectious diseases. Figure 3.5 gives a comparative analysis of the crude deaths accounted 
for by the WHO (2010–2011)22 and those attributed to infectious diseases. It can be seen that in South 
Africa, which had the highest crude deaths in the region (869,425), almost half of these were due to 
infectious diseases, including influenza, pneumonia and diarrhoeal diseases. Other health, non-
infectious, related deaths account for a significant proportion of the remaining causes with strokes, 
coronary heart disease and diabetes claiming 23,139, 20,506 and 19,530 lives respectively. Of the 
southern African states Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia reflect significantly high data, with 65 
percent, 58 percent and 57 percent of recorded deaths being due to infectious disease. Of note also is 
the DRC, which is the only state currently enduring civil conflict of a military nature: 67 percent of 
deaths recorded in the DRC were due to infectious disease, other causes included maternal/birth 
complications, road traffic accidents and malnutrition, while death due to direct warfare constituted 
only 3 percent of the recorded deaths. 
                                                          
22  Data compiled from WHO and UN Population and Health Reports 2010 & 2011. Calculations detailed in Appendix B.  
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From the above analysis it is clear that infectious disease is the chief cause of death in southern 
Africa, and consequently, public health emerges as the most significant concern to human security at 
present in southern Africa. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
In light of the compelling data presented above it is apparent that the high disease burden in southern 
Africa has had adverse effects on human security in the region: lowering life expectancy, increasing 
child and adult mortality rates and eroding the quality of life of individuals across the region. The 
threat that infectious diseases pose to human life far surpasses concerns of military warfare in 
southern Africa. This high disease burden is of particular concern in the face of inadequate state and 
regional structures to manage and curtail the spread of life-threatening diseases such as HIV/AIDS 
and TB. As such the Zimbabwean case presents a unique challenge to the region. At the height of the 
political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe in 2008 the public health sector of Zimbabwe had 
deteriorated so dramatically that it failed to provide even the most basic of treatments to the 
Zimbabwean populace.  
The following chapters will detail the deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe and the 
ramifications this crisis has had on the southern African region. Through interviews with key actors in 
the public health sector of Zimbabwe, and a review of SADC policy and action, it will become 
apparent that SADC and its member states have not responded adequately to the public health concern 
in the region, raising further concerns of regional stability and capacity.  
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Chapter Four– The Public Health Crisis of Zimbabwe  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of Zimbabwe and its neighbouring states23                                                           
 
4.1 Introduction 
The southern African landlocked country of Zimbabwe has received unprecedented attention in the 
past decade, due in no small part to the authoritarian leadership of its president, Robert Mugabe, who 
has been described by political commentators as a „tyrant‟ a „brutal dictator‟ and even a „political 
thug‟ (Meredith, 2007, p. 5). The political landscape of the former British colony has long been 
plagued with controversy. In an act of unprecedented defiance of the British monarchy the white 
minority government of Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965, drawing 
much international attention to the southern African state. Again in 1979 the government of Ian Smith 
prematurely declared independence after a series of negotiations with the African elite. However, the 
liberation movements representing the African majority, the Zimbabwe African People‟s Union 
(ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), continued the guerrilla war across the 
country, ignoring the peace accord. This foiled attempt at independence once again drew the world‟s 
attention to the turbulent internal politics of the nation. 
 
                                                          
23 Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/zimbabwe.html 
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However, it is the leadership of incumbent President Mugabe in recent years that has captured the 
attention of international media, political commentators and academics.  
 
Zimbabwe attained political independence in 1980, this saw the replacement of the British colonial 
government of Rhodesia with a democratically elected African Government. President Mugabe, who 
has led the nation since 1980, also leads the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF),24 a political party which traditionally enjoyed almost absolute support due to its 
liberation credentials. The once prosperous state is presently caught in an enduring economic and 
political collapse: rampant corruption, the disregard of democratic practices, bilateral sanctions, and 
state-sponsored violence against political opposition, coupled with a mismanaged land re-distribution 
programme have resulted in the widespread collapse of the economy and the inability of the state to 
provide basic services to its citizens. This situation is commonly referred to as the „Zimbabwean 
Crisis‟.25 Unlike states such as Afghanistan, Iraq or the DRC which are considered as failed states 
(Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003), Zimbabwe is the only state undergoing such crises in the 21st century 
in the absence of military conflict.  
 
A great deal of attention has been placed on the economic and political collapse of Zimbabwe and the 
resultant effects on the political climate of the nation. Numerous reports, task papers, academic 
articles and commentaries have been published in the last decade probing the lack of democratic 
processes, the decay of state function, and the complicity of the state in the repression of citizens and 
political opposition in Zimbabwe (Addison, 2000; Goredema, 2001; Maclean, 2002; Maroleng, 2003; 
Dansereau et al., 2005; Hentz, 2005; Chitiyo, 2006; Brett, 2008; Coltart, 2008; Mamdani, 2008). 
These analyses have focused largely on matters of high politics, that is, matters concerned with the 
survival of the state, such as national security and political stability, largely ignoring matters of non-
state/social concern. Similarly, international policy and recommendations aimed at resolving the 
Zimbabwe situation have focused on concerns of „high politics‟, with the European Union (EU) and 
USA calling for sanctions to be placed on Zimbabwe, such as those placed on Iraq in 1990. Similar 
calls have been made for legal action through the International Criminal Court or even military 
intervention (IOLNews, 30; AllAfrica, 2006; Peacock, 2009; Guma, 2012). Much pressure was placed 
on the Security Council in 2008 to deal more forcibly with Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government 
after a violent election saw Mugabe retaining the presidency. However, due to support from the veto 
wielding China and Russia Mugabe and his party have managed to escape any global action through 
the UN (Nasaw, 2008, p. 1). 
  
                                                          
24 An amalgamation of the two major liberation movements: Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU). 
25 The study will use this term when speaking about the economic and political collapse of Zimbabwe. 
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All these recommendations, though valid, negate the significant non-political crises in Zimbabwe. 
Apart from the work done by human rights NGOs26  and UN institutions such as WHO, UNICEF and 
UNAIDS, much less attention has been paid to matters of „low politics‟ in Zimbabwe, such as acute 
shortages of clean water, shelter, health care and education.  
 
Matters of low politics have been completely overshadowed by concerns of state survival, political 
stability and independence. The primary role that the political rule of ZANU-PF has played in the 
demise of Zimbabwe has largely obscured the responses to the Zimbabwe situation, which are mostly 
aimed at limiting the political rule of ZANU-PF and at restoring democratic rule. Yet it is not just the 
political apparatus that has suffered, but the entire fabric of the nation. In particular, the situation in 
Zimbabwe has crippled the state‟s ability to provide adequate social services, such as education, 
housing and health care; eroding the capacity of these departments to function due to the relentless 
migration abroad of its skilled personnel. Basic amenities such as electricity and clean water are 
scarce even in urban cities. The effects of the political instability and economic downward spiral in 
Zimbabwe have extended to matters of social cohesion, national identity and the rule of law.   
 
This situation was aptly summarised by Raftopoulos (2010): 
 
Although popularly referred to as the „Zimbabwean crisis‟, what has been occurring in the country since 
the turn of the new millennium is a complex and inter-related multi-layered and pervasive catastrophe 
that can, perhaps, best be described as a series of „Zimbabwean crises‟, for no aspect of Zimbabwean 
existence escaped the deleterious effects of this phenomenon. The crisis has been evident in the 
country‟s economic and socio-political life and the negative ripple effects that emanated from a 
progressively dysfunctional state (Raftopoulos et al., 2010, p. 1). 
 
The Zimbabwe scenario presents a complex case of political and economic collapse, which has led to 
equally complex consequences for the Zimbabwean society. This chapter aims to single out the key 
elements of the „Zimbabwean crisis‟, in particular those elements which led to the deterioration of the 
public health sector. It will then explore the effects that this deterioration has had on the region, with 
particular reference to human security and regional stability.  It will become apparent that the inability 
of Zimbabwe to provide its citizens with adequate social services, in particular public health, and the 
subsequent mass migration of Zimbabwean nationals into the southern African region, has had 
adverse effects on the SADC region: threatening regional health and human security, and 
overwhelming the regional structures of SADC and individual SADC states.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Particularly Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Commission of the Red Cross. 
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4.2 The Deterioration of the Public Health Sector  
There are a plethora of resources focused on the descent of Zimbabwe into political and economic 
collapse, most of which point to the rule of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. However, this simplistic view 
negates the complex web of events leading up to the Zimbabwean Crisis. Any objective analysis must 
therefore look at all aspects of the crises regardless of popular opinion and rhetoric. This section 
outlines key policies and events in the history of Zimbabwe that were instrumental in the breakdown 
of social service provision in Zimbabwe. It will become clear that the deterioration of the public 
health sector of Zimbabwe is a result of the implementation of ill-considered political and economic 
policies by the government of Zimbabwe, which systematically eroded the public health system.  
 
For the purposes of clarity, these events will be detailed in chronological order, focusing on the 
periods 1990–2000, 2000–2008 and 2008 onwards.27 
 
The Deterioration of the Public Health Sector:  1990–2000 
Raftopolous and Phimister, premier Zimbabwean historians, assert that the current crisis is a result of 
a combination of the complementary dynamics of domestic tyranny and developmental collapse 
(Raftopolous & Phimister, 2004, p. 356).  Key to this observation is the period between 1990 and 
2000. During this period the ZANU-PF government made three key decisions that adversely affected 
the public health sector: the implementation of the IMF-sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP), the choice to go to war in the DRC, and the mismanagement of the land issue. 
 
In 1990 the government of Zimbabwe introduced ESAP, an economic programme that initiated a 
series of economic reforms which aimed to create a more modern, competitive, export-led and 
industrialised economy. Although each country was treated as a separate economic unit, such 
programmes had set formulas of structural adjustment measures that included devaluation, 
deregulation, desubsidisation and privatisation. In the early 1980s, Zimbabwe had been a star 
performer in Africa in the provision of social services and in the reconstruction and development of 
its public infrastructure, most of which was financed by the government without jeopardising relative 
macroeconomic stability (Saunders, 1996, p. 6).  However towards the end of the 1980s the 
government was faced with decreased local production, stagnant local demand and a worsening 
unemployment problem that threatened to become politically troublesome. The new government had 
unwisely taken on a role similar to that of the Rhodesian regime, in which a form of „state-capitalism‟ 
developed that allowed the state to serve as a buffer, protecting elites and workers from political and 
                                                          
27 These periods are of relevance as 1990 saw the introduction of significant economic reforms in Zimbabwe, 2000 marked 
the official endorsement of the fast-track land redistribution programme, and 2008 saw the introduction of the Government 
of National Unity in Zimbabwe. The significance of these events will be detailed in this section 
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economic competition and the small vulnerable economy from external shocks and pressures. 
Maintaining a stable corporatism in Zimbabwe‟s class- and racially-divided society was dependent on 
preserving a delicate economic equilibrium of growth with equity. Initially, in 1980-81, the hope that 
this precarious balance might be preserved was fuelled by an economic boom which helped to finance 
the substantial increase in expenditures on social services. However, such prosperity was short-lived 
and, for the remainder of the 1980s, the growth rate hovered around 3 percent per annum (compared 
with a projected 8 percent), net investment levels were low (average 3.6 percent), gross fixed capital 
formation declined and the budget deficit increased (Maclean, 1997, p. 159). Due to a lack of 
participation of the local private sector and capital inflows from overseas, ESAP emerged as the most 
viable solution to avoid a further economic downturn. 
 
The reforms enforced by ESAP included trade and currency deregulation, devaluation of the 
Zimbabwe dollar, movement towards high real interest rates, the lifting of price controls, significant 
cuts in social spending and the removal of consumer subsidies.  A central component of these reforms 
was the extension of credit from the IMF to fuel the economy: in 1992, the IMF made the first 
disbursement of US$216 million. Further amounts of US$65 million, US$76 million and US$75 
million followed in 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively (Coltart, 2008, p. 12). The combined measures 
of these reforms were meant to translate into the reduction of the government deficit, civil service 
reform and shedding of public enterprises. However, in a country where local production was highly 
integrated and often efficient, and where a large state provided a range of quality social services, for 
most the reforms represented more peril than promise (Saunders, 1996, p. 9). Only five years after the 
implementation of ESAP, the Zimbabwean economy was described to be in a “quagmire of mounting 
debt and erratic growth” (Saunders, 1996, p. 8). 
 
The economic reforms ushered in a recession: the economy contracted by an estimated 7.5 percent, 
and in 1992 the country suffered a severe drought which affected its agriculture-based production 
sector. At the same time, price control relaxation saw inflation explode and consumer demand shrink 
by as much as 30 percent. Trade-union analysts outlined that employment growth had fallen from 2.4 
percent in the late 1980s to 1.55 percent in the period 1991-97 (Mamdani, 2008, p. 2).  A review of 
ESAP after five years showed that the percentage of households living in poverty throughout the 
country increased by 14 percent, economic growth slowed and became erratic, averaging only 1.2 
percent, not the projected 5 percent. Inflation remained high, averaging 28.8 percent between 1991–
94, instead of falling to the projected 10 percent (Kanyeze, 2006). The Zimbabwe Programme for 
Economic Transformation (ZIMPREST) was implemented between 1996 and 2000, as a continuation 
of ESAP.  
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These reforms had adverse effects on the social services. As noted by Saunders:  
There was a shift in emphasis in the redesign of the state‟s social programs, away from a concern with 
issues of equity and access, towards a system of management driven primarily by the problem of how to 
administer the supply of services given defined, limited resources. The negative social and economic 
consequences of this shift were immediately and abundantly clear for ordinary Zimbabweans. Of 
particular note was the rapid deterioration in the country‟s acclaimed health and education sectors 
(Saunders, 1996, p. 9). 
 
Public expenditure on health care declined by 39 percent in 1994/95 (Saunders, 1996, p. 9). Health 
allocation in 1990 constituted 3.1 percent of GDP (US$22 per capita) but had fallen to 2.1 percent 
(US$11 per capita) in 1996, and fell further by 2000 (Dhliwayo, 2001, p. 5). This decrease implied 
diminished spending on common drugs, preventive health services, specialist facilities and treatment, 
and other components of quality health care delivery.  The term “ESAP deaths” became common after 
1992, describing deaths caused by the inability of patients to pay for the minimal length of time in the 
hospital, or for prescription medicine. ESAP resulted in the emergence of a two-tier health care 
system, where individuals who had private resources to access quality healthcare could do so, and 
those who were unable to pay, who were the majority, became increasingly marginalised from quality 
services  (Saunders, 1996, p. 9). The effects of this under-spending on health was most clearly 
demonstrated by the decline in health indicators: life expectancy declined, mother and infant mortality 
rates increased, and the incidence rates of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and TB rose to 
among the highest on the continent. In addition, the widespread wage cuts of civil servants triggered 
the relocation of public health personnel to the more lucrative private health sector, and abroad. Of the 
1,200 physicians trained in Zimbabwe during the 1990s, only 360 were still practising in the country 
in 2001 (Lowell & Findlay, 2001, p. 14).  
 
The implementation of ESAP had two key consequences on the provision of public health care in 
Zimbabwe. Firstly, it caused a decline in government spending on public health, eroding the human 
resources base, reducing positive health outcomes and the overall quality of health care available to 
the public. Secondly, it created a dependency on external funding for vital domestic social services. 
Due to mandatory limits on government spending on social services, Zimbabwe became increasingly 
dependent on international aid, development funds and international donations to buttress the budget 
of the public health sector. This overdependence on external funding proved detrimental to the public 
health sector at the turn of the new millennium, when extreme international debt and the political 
choices of ZANU-PF led to the expulsion of Zimbabwe from the IMF and the World Bank. 
 
The economic decline during this period was exacerbated by the economic mismanagement of the 
government of Zimbabwe. The outcomes of the structural adjustment programmes were further 
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limited by the government‟s inability to restrict spending and domestic debt as prescribed by the IMF. 
Although reviews of structural adjustment programmes initiated in other developing states have 
yielded similarly disappointing results (Klein, 2007; Maclean, 1997), assessments of the Zimbabwe 
case point to fiscal mismanagement as a major contributor to the negative economic outcomes of that 
decade (Dhlodhlo & Mabugu, 2000; Coltart, 2008). In 1998 Mugabe made a widely unpopular 
decision to intervene in the DRC. The choice to go to war was motivated firstly by a need to shore up 
the SADC collective security structures, and more importantly the war in DRC was seen as an 
economic opportunity by the ruling elite to secure mining and military partnerships (Dashwood, 2000, 
p. 104). The war began to eat into the national reserves, further weakening the fragile economy, as 
early as 1996 Mugabe had already donated US$5million to Kabila to finance his revolt against 
Mabuto (Nest, 2001, p. 484). In 2000, the Minister of Finance reported that since joining the war in 
August 1998, Zimbabwe had spent US$5.2 million in its first five months, US$78 million in 1999, 
and US$120 million in the first six months of 2000, placing the cost at around US$200 million – just 
above Z$10 billion (Makoni, 2000). This extravagant spending took place against the backdrop of 
diminishing domestic social spending with funding cuts to health, education, and other social services. 
 
Towards the end of the millennium the most prominent issue in Zimbabwe‟s internal politics was the 
concern of land redistribution. The need to address the unequal distribution of land began at 
independence but by 2000 it dominated the entire sphere of Zimbabwean politics. Ten years after 
independence ZANU-PF found itself facing increasing opposition from two separate yet equally 
significant groups. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), a ZANU-PF ally, which had 
become disgruntled with increased mismanagement and corruption within the party, and the 
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA),28 war veterans of the 
liberation struggle who had been disenfranchised by the Lancaster House Agreement.29 The initiation 
of ESAP had led to increased unemployment, inflation and poverty, all of which created a downturn 
in development, employment rates and wages. ZCTU emerged as a formidable social force, 
mobilising its autonomous national base to present a direct challenge to the ruling party‟s economic 
and political policies. The second source of opposition, the war veterans, posed a novel challenge to 
ZANU-PF. Although their strength lay in the countryside, the war vets formed the only alliance that 
was independent of both Mugabe and ZANU-PF that could legitimately lay claim to the liberation 
credentials that ZANU-PF so readily exploited to garner national support (Mamdani, 2008, p. 18). 
The inability of the state to maintain high levels of social expenditure, control labour wages and 
                                                          
28 Formed in 1988. 
29 The Lancaster House Agreement was the independence agreement brokered between the government of Rhodesia, Britain 
and the leaders of the Zimbabwean liberation movements. It stipulated conditions for the introduction of an African-led 
majority government, but also set key limits on the acquisition of land. No land resettlement was to take place until 1990, 
after which all transfers must be on a „willing buyer, willing seller‟ basis, which would be funded by the British government.  
It also reserved 20 percent of seats in the House of Assembly for whites, giving the settler community an effective veto over 
any amendment to the Lancaster House terms. 
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resettle the growing numbers of landless people, meant that combined these two forces stood as a 
significant threat to the legitimacy and reign of the party. 
 
The issue of land was especially contentious. At independence approximately 6,000 white farmers 
owned 15.5 million hectares of prime land, 39 percent of the land in the country, while about 4.5 
million black farmers (a million households) in „communal areas‟ were left to subsist on 16.4 million 
hectares of the most arid land (Moyo, 2000, p. 5). As such, the unequal distribution of land translated 
into an unequal distribution of wealth. However, due to the limitations of the independence agreement 
the transfer of land during the first ten years was minimal. The government sought to remedy this with 
the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which gave the state powers of compulsory purchase. However, 
this mechanism depended on British compensation. The British government provided minimal 
assistance in this regard, releasing only £44 million between 1990 and 1992 (Moyo, 2000, p. 7). In 
1997 the New Labour government relinquished its responsibility to Zimbabwe altogether, claiming 
that they could not be held to account for agreements made by a previous administration. This 
effectively violated the Lancaster House Agreement and tacitly indemnified the Zimbabwean 
government to take full responsibility for the land redistribution project. At this time there was 
widespread squatting on all types of land, from communal areas to state land, commercial farms, 
resettlement areas and urban sites. The number of landless individuals was increasing and the 
government of Zimbabwe simply could not afford to compensate farmers for land at market value. 
Under increased pressure from ZNLWVA to acquire commercial farm land without compensation, in 
1998 Mugabe decided to roll out an unbudgeted Z$50,000 in gratuities and monthly pensions of 
Z$2,000 to war veterans, in a bid to appease their frustrations (Raftopoulos et al., 2010, p. 2). These 
payments further strained the already depleted state reserves, and their ability to appease ZNLWVA 
was ephemeral. 
 
These three factors primed the public health sector for collapse: ESAP cut social spending and created 
a pattern of dependence on external funding for the provision of public health care. The decision to go 
to war in DRC and the use of payments to ward off political opposition from ZNLWVA led to the 
depletion of national reserves, and further under spending on public health. The resultant exodus of 
health personnel left the public health sector without adequate financing or human resources to 
provide quality health care to the Zimbabwean populace. It is important to note that these factors 
affected not only the provision of public health care, but the entire scope of social services: education, 
water and sanitation, shelter etc, creating a „ripple effect‟ of destabilisation. 
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The Deterioration of the Public Health Sector:  2000–2008  
By 2000 every aspect of Zimbabwean politics had became engulfed by the politics of the land. In 
February 2000 ZANU-PF was dealt a devastating blow when the nation rejected a referendum for 
constitutional reform. This referendum would have allowed the government to acquire land with no 
compensation from white farmers and to prolong Mugabe‟s terms as president. The ZCTU, which had 
now transformed into a political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), received much 
support and financing from the British Government and white commercial farmers to lobby the urban 
masses to vote „no‟ to the new constitution – an outcome they managed to secure. So when members 
of ZNLWVA began forcibly and illegally invading white-owned farms in June 2000, the ZANU-PF 
government did little to impede them. In the face of the rejected referendum and increased pressure 
from the war veterans, the government endorsed the land acquisitions and so commenced the „fast 
track‟ land reform programme. At the end of 2003 land had been seized from nearly 4,000 white 
farmers and redistributed: 72,000 large farmers received 2.19 million hectares and 127,000 
smallholders received 4.23 million hectares (Mamdani, 2008, p. 17). This led inevitably to the 
destabilisation of Zimbabwe‟s agricultural sector. The tobacco industry, which was Zimbabwe‟s 
single largest generator of foreign exchange and accounted for almost a third of Zimbabwe‟s foreign 
exchange earnings in 2000, collapsed almost completely. The crop that earned some US$600 million 
in 2000 generated less than US$125 million in 2007. Annual wheat production has plummeted from a 
high of over 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000 in 2007 (Coltart, 2008, p. 4). This resulted in 
food insecurity and diminished national export revenues, further shrinking the finite resources 
available for social spending.  
 
Leading up to the 2002 elections ZANU-PF began a tactical, violent and costly anti-MDC campaign. 
In 2010 it was revealed that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had released Z$1.1 billion during this 
period to fund a pro-ZANU-PF farm mechanisation programme, aimed at cementing rural support for 
the party (Nyambabvu, 2011). The country‟s foreign exchange reserves had declined exponentially, 
from US$830 million, representing three months‟ import cover in 1996, to less than one month‟s 
cover by 2006 (Mamdani, 2008, p. 11). By 2003 spending on health had declined by US$197 million 
since 2000 (Clemens & Moss, 2005, p. 3). Doctors, nurses and other skilled personnel, whose salaries 
had not been paid in months, left en masse to find work in the region and abroad. A 2003 study 
estimated that more than 80 percent of doctors, nurses, pharmacists, radiologists and therapists trained 
since 1980 had left the country, and that by 2003 Zimbabwe had lost more than 2,100 medical doctors 
and 1,950 certified nurses, mostly to South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Britain and Australia 
(Chetsanga & Muchenje, 2003, p. 3). For those that stayed the lack of medication, resources and even 
water made the provision of healthcare very difficult. 
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The government of Zimbabwe, which had previously managed to balance both its political and social 
responsibilities, was now focused squarely on the land and its politics. The survival of ZANU-PF 
dominated the policy initiatives of the government. The depleted reserves were channelled to fortify 
the success of the land redistribution programme which ZANU-PF desperately needed to maintain 
support.  
 
The second factor to consider is the economic climate of Zimbabwe during this period. In 2000 the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank suspended their loan facilities to the government of 
Zimbabwe, whose account was in arrears of US$900 million and US$406 million respectively (Jones, 
2011, p. 14). In 2001, Zimbabwe started to incur arrears to both the General Resources Account 
(GRA) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) facilities offered by the IMF. As a 
result, the IMF‟s Executive Board imposed a number of escalating measures, eventually declaring 
Zimbabwe ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF, removed Zimbabwe from the list of 
countries eligible to borrow resources under the PRGT, and suspended the provision of technical 
assistance to Zimbabwe (IMF, 2001). In 2006, Zimbabwe fully settled its GRA arrears to the IMF, 
which led to a cancellation of the procedures for the compulsory withdrawal, however, it was not till 
May 2009, after the incorporation of the MDC into the government of Zimbabwe, that the IMF began 
to consider the restoration of Zimbabwe‟s voting rights and its eligibility to use resources from the 
GRA. In 2010 the Executive Board decided to restore Zimbabwe‟s voting and related rights, stating 
that “notwithstanding the restoration of the eligibility to use GRA resources, Zimbabwe will not be 
able to use resources from the GRA or the PRGT,” which in essence restored Zimbabwe onto the list 
of eligible states but denied it access to the funding and credit facilities it previously enjoyed (IMF, 
2010).  
 
International forces further constrained the provision of social services. Unable to secure formal 
action against the Mugabe regime through the UN, interested international players30 began to isolate 
the ZANU-PF government. This was triggered by the choice to go to war in DRC, by the land 
invasions of 2000 and by ZANU-PF‟s subsequent violent and undemocratic campaign to remain in 
power in the 2002 elections. Several international measures were implemented to restrict the reach of 
ZANU-PF as the international community argued that had the 2002 presidential elections been 
conducted under free and fair conditions, Mugabe and ZANU-PF would not have retained power 
(EISA, 2002). There was a mass exodus of international firms from the private business sector, 
foreign direct investment shrunk from US$444.3 million in 1998 to US$50 million in 2006. Donor 
support, even to the vital public health sector, dried up. For example Danish support for the health 
sector, US$29.7 million in 2000 was suspended (Mamdani, 2008, p. 20).  The United States 
                                                          
30 Mostly the United States and the European Union. 
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government passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZIDERA)31 
which was intended to “provide for a transition to democracy and to promote economic recovery in 
Zimbabwe” (United States Congress, 2001). This Act prevents the government of Zimbabwe from 
accessing international credit, bars US companies from trading with the government of Zimbabwe and 
any third party representatives, and restricts any international financial institution from cancelling or 
reducing any debt incurred by the government of Zimbabwe. So while this Act was constructed to 
facilitate democratic transition, its prescriptions translate into restrictions similar to those imposed by 
global sanctions. The Ministry of Health is still unable to access much needed global credit from any 
institution while ZANU-PF is in government.  
 
These international measures were initiated in a bid to impede the rule of ZANU-PF, however, the 
withdrawal of foreign business, foreign aid and donations have negatively impacted the government 
structures tasked with the provision of social services. These factors, coupled with the legacy of ESAP 
and the mismanagement of ZANU-PF, brought the public health sector of Zimbabwe to near collapse. 
By 2008 the public health sector of Zimbabwe was grossly understaffed and underfinanced, and the 
physical infrastructure and machinery were in crucial need of maintenance and replacement. In rural 
areas it was reported that women delivering children were requested to bring their own water, candles, 
gloves and sterilising fluids (Madzimbamuto & Todd, 2010, p. 606). The public health sector simply 
could not provide even the most basic services required by the populace.  
 
The Deterioration of the Public Health Sector:  2008 and onwards  
The year 2008 was of particular political significance as the much anticipated presidential and 
parliamentary elections were to be held in March. An intense and controversial first round of elections 
saw MDC gaining a parliamentary majority but its presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, failing 
to acquire the required 51 percent majority over incumbent Mugabe. Defeated in the first round 
ZANU-PF initiated a violent campaign leading up to the second round of presidential elections. 
ZANU-PF militia reportedly assaulted and tortured civilians in pro-MDC areas, abducted and/or 
arrested numerous MDC leaders and banned MDC campaigning. Amid the increasing violence 
Tsvangirai pulled out of the election race, delivering an overwhelming victory to Mugabe. ZANU-
PF‟s campaign of intimidation secured them another term in government, but the public unrest 
continued. Post-election violence erupted across the country, especially in urban areas (MDC 
strongholds) that refused to recognise the victory of ZANU-PF (EISA, 2008). Under the leadership of 
SADC Thabo Mbeki led a diplomatic team that managed to broker a unity agreement between the two 
factions of MDC and ZANU-PF in February 2009. This Global Political Agreement (GPA) saw the 
introduction of a Government of National Unity (GNU) that included Morgan Tsvangirai as the Prime 
                                                          
31 Bill passed in 2001 and renewed in 2003 and 2010. 
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Minister of Zimbabwe and Professor Arthur Mutambara and Thokozani Khupe as the two Deputy 
Prime Ministers (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009). In the background of these intensely volatile 
political events the social services of Zimbabwe were simply not a priority. 
 
Chris Beyrer, public health specialist at Johns Hopkins, told The Lancet that “access to health care has 
collapsed for all except the tiny minority who can pay for care in US dollars. The public system has 
truly ceased to function” (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). Precipitated by the factors detailed above the public 
health sector was beset with acute shortages of supplies and personnel. With 80 percent of all doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, radiologists and therapists now working abroad, and those who remained earning 
an average of US$30 per month, the provision of public health care was at a standstill (Chetsanga & 
Muchenje, 2003, p. 3). This problem was further compounded by the fact that, due to staff shortages, 
the University of Zimbabwe medical training hospital in Harare was forced to reduce its annual intake 
of medical students from 120 to 70, so not only was the system haemorrhaging massive numbers of 
skilled health workers, the state‟s capacity to train more professionals was diminishing  (Leslie, 2008, 
p. 20).The dilapidated infrastructure and the recurrent strikes by grossly underpaid medical workers 
left the health care system in disarray. In some instances it was shown that the lack of doctors and 
medication at some government hospital was in fact fuelling the intensity of infectious diseases in the 
country (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). 
 
Amon Siveregi, President of the Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association, said shortages of drugs, 
equipment, and staff had rendered the opening of most public hospitals futile. He said heath care 
workers were poorly remunerated, which greatly affected their performance, and the crisis had 
prompted thousands of well-qualified medical workers to leave the country in search of better 
working conditions (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). Without a foundation of skilled human resources, health 
care systems cannot function adequately or effectively, particularly in the public sector and at the 
primary level of care.  
 
In addition to the massive loss of medical staff, the majority of public hospitals lacked adequate funds 
and equipment to operate. Increasing numbers of HIV patients required Anti – Retroviral Treatment 
(ART), which was costly and difficult to source. Sikhumbuzo Mvinjelwa (Zimbabwe National 
Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS, Harare, Zimbabwe) reported that access to antiretroviral 
drugs and treatment had been hampered by frequent closures of hospitals. In the capital, Harare, three 
top antiretroviral dispensing hospitals – Chitungwiza, Harare Central and Parirenyatwa – were 
operating only occasionally since November 2008 when the government closed public hospitals and 
police attacked striking doctors, nurses and medical students at the teaching hospital. According to 
Mvinjelwa, lack of resources and staff shortages had also forced health centres to keep their 
HIV/AIDS units closed (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). In 2007 140,000 people died of AIDS in Zimbabwe, 
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largely due to the unavailability of medication (WHO, 2011, p. 10). Health workers say that aside 
from drug shortages, hospitals often lack basic medical supplies such as bandages, cleaning agents, 
and surgical gloves. At the height of the political crisis in 2008 both Médecins Sans Frontières and 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) suggested that the department of public health “be taken into a 
kind of receivership by a UN-designated agency or consortium, until a functioning government 
capable of providing a minimum standard of care is in place” (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). While the 
public health sector began to recover after the introduction of the GNU in 2009, public hospitals are 
largely understaffed and the shortage of vital resources, such as water and electricity, pose a serious 
challenge for the basic functioning of hospitals. As of February 2012 only 8.2 percent of the US$64 
million budgeted for health had been released (Zimbabwe Treasury, 2012).  The provision of private 
health care has in part supplemented the inadequacies of the public sector. There are four private 
hospitals in Harare, two of which offer accident and emergency services, and an increasing number of 
private clinics and well-equipped trauma centres. Bulawayo, Mutare and other centres also have 
private facilities. However due to the continued political impasse and slow economic recovery the 
majority of Zimbabweans still do not have the finances to access private health care.   
 
It has been established that southern Africa is host to many human security concerns, of which public 
health is the most significant. Chapters Two and Three of this study recount in detail the advances in 
Security Studies that have allowed for the incorporation of public health into security agendas, the 
vital nature of this threat, and the significant burden of disease present in southern Africa. The study 
asserts that if such threats are not managed adequately, these concerns to human security have the 
ability to permeate state borders, and affect regional security and stability.  
 
Contemporary international politics is characterised by increased levels of interdependence and the 
connectivity of states and populations, more so than in any other era. It is now well accepted in 
academic and political circles that the spread of disease constitutes a real concern to both national and 
international security (Youde, 2004). The provision of security requires increased collaboration 
between states, especially those that share borders. Focusing on southern Africa it can be seen that the 
high burden of infectious disease in Zimbabwe, the inability of the national structures to ensure public 
health and the continued migration of Zimbabweans into the southern African region, present a 
significant security concern for the region, one that requires attention and collective action from the 
SADC nations. As noted by Frank Donaghue: “since contagious disease needs no passport, the 
[Zimbabwean] government‟s abrogation of its responsibility is now a regional health and security 
threat” (Wakabi, 2009, p. 147). The outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe in 2008 serves as an apt 
example to demonstrate the hypothesis put forward by this study: the outbreak of cholera in 
Zimbabwe, unabated by a deficient public health sector, rapidly progressed into a national epidemic 
claiming 4,276 lives in Zimbabwe, and a further 636 in the region (WHO, 2008).  
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4.3 Regional Dimensions of Public Health: The Cholera Outbreak of 2008 
Cholera is an acute intestinal infection caused by the consumption of food and water contaminated 
with the bacterium Vibrio cholera, which manifests itself as a diarrhoeal sickness. The provision of 
safe drinking water, adequate sanitation and food safety are critical to preventing and reducing the 
spread of cholera. Public health messages to enhance communities‟ preventive behaviour to halt 
further contamination and infection are equally important. Whist interventions to mitigate the spread 
of cholera are relatively simple and cheap, they are dependent upon functional health systems, 
effective surveillance, early detection and rapid response mechanisms (CDC, 2011, p. 1). At the time 
that cholera broke out in August 2008, the provision of clean water in most urban areas of Zimbabwe 
was insufficient. Warnings of a possible cholera outbreak were tabled to the incumbent Minister of 
Health, Dr D. Parirenyatwa, however they were not effectively heeded. The government health 
systems, incapacitated by the surrounding political and economic environment, were severely 
compromised and their response to the outbreak was delayed and inadequate. The national outbreak 
deteriorated dramatically before concerted responses were initiated. The government only 
acknowledged the crisis five months after its onset, by which time Zimbabwe‟s national health 
systems were under severe pressure and its capabilities overwhelmed (Hwenda, Mahlathi & 
Maphanga, 2011, p. 15).  
 
The concomitant exodus of people into neighbouring countries allowed cholera spill over into the 
entire SADC region. SADC, for its part, did not have an appropriate response mechanism to mitigate 
the spread of the epidemic into the entire SADC community, and so cases of cholera were reported in 
every SADC state, mostly at border posts and border towns. Across countries, differences in reported 
cases, case fatality rates and the total number of deaths, as shown in Table 4.1, illustrate the different 
response capacities within countries. Countries without a concurrent internal crisis whose health 
systems were not under severe stress, such as Botswana (2 deaths) and Namibia (9 deaths), had fewer 
cases, lower case fatality rates and lower total recorded deaths. 
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Country Reported 
Cases 
Reported 
Deaths 
Case 
Fatality 
Rate 
Time Period 
Zimbabwe  98,349  4,276 4.4% 15 Aug 2008–24 May 2009 
Mozambique  17,761  140 0.8% 1 Jan 2009–9 May 2009 
Swaziland  17,448  0 0.0% 22 Dec 2008–16 May 2009 
South Africa  12,752  65 0.5% 15 Nov 2008–31 May 2009 
Zambia  8,312  173 2.1% 10 Sept 2008–7 May 2009 
Angola  7,495  134 1.8% 1 Jan 2008–17 May 2009 
Malawi  5,269  113 2.1% 15 Nov 2008–24 May 2009 
Namibia  203  9 4.4% 22 Oct 2008–17 Apr 2009 
Botswana  15  2 13.3% 1 Nov 2008–24 May 2009 
Total      167,604  4,912   
Table 4.1: Cholera Deaths in SADC 2008–2009 Cholera Season32 
 
The cases of cholera reported in the region were not haphazard: an analysis of the circumstances 
specific to the epidemic confirms a causal relationship between the regional cases and those in 
Zimbabwe.33 Although there had been outbreaks of cholera in Zimbabwe prior to 2008, none had 
taken on a regional dimension as seen in 2008. Previous outbreaks that took place while the public 
health sector of Zimbabwe was intact were contained and managed (Hwenda, Mahlathi & Maphanga, 
2011, p. 17).  The only differing factor in the cholera outbreak of 2008 was the absence of functioning 
public health structures to combat the disease. Secondly, although some SADC states have had similar 
significant outbreaks of diarrhoeal diseases, such as cholera and typhoid, the correlation of the time 
frames of the outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe, the contagious nature of the disease and the 
subsequent cases reported throughout the region point to the migration of Zimbabwean nationals as 
the main contributing factor. In addition, the locations where these cases were reported is of 
significance: the majority of cases were reported in the Limpopo Province of South Africa 
(Muthambi, 2009), while the WHO received reports from the Ministries of Health confirming cholera 
cases in Palm Tree (Botswana) and Guro district (Mozambique), all of which are regions that share 
borders with Zimbabwe (WHO, 2008, p. 1). It is clear that the regional cases of cholera were 
precipitated by the Zimbabwe epidemic, which itself was a direct consequence of the deficient public 
health structures of Zimbabwe.  
 
4.4 Migration and Regional Security 
The key factor that has lead to vital human security concerns such as public health taking on regional 
dimensions, as opposed to their traditional domestic reach, is the intensification of migration in the 
                                                          
32 Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Regional Update 2009 
33 Cases in Angola are independent of the Zimbabwe case. Due to geography Angola is not a common site if humanitarian 
migrants from Zimbabwe. In addition, Angola has enduring Cholera problem due to extended rainy seasons and poor 
sanitation infrastructure. 
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region. There is a long history of migration within the southern African region dating from the pre-
colonial times (Crush & James, 1995; Worger, 1987; MacDonald, 2000). It is beyond doubt that these 
migration patterns have been produced and influenced by different events throughout history. 
However, the unprecedented migration of Zimbabweans into the region since 2000 has been 
generated largely by the economic and political collapse.  
 
The Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at the University of the Witwatersrand conducted 
extensive studies on migration patterns in southern Africa, in particular the migration of Zimbabwean 
nationals. In their report Zimbabwean Migration into Southern Africa: New Trends and Responses 
they assert that Zimbabweans are „humanitarian migrants‟ who they define as individuals “who are 
fleeing extreme deprivation or starvation for themselves or their families” (Monson & Kiwanuka, 
2009, p. 5). These migrations are categorised as forced rather than voluntary as these distinct flows 
occur against the background of political instability and economic collapse in Zimbabwe. And while 
the profile of Zimbabwean migrants is mixed, that is, shoppers, traders, borderline residents and 
transit migrants, FMSP found that the majority are humanitarian migrants. They also found that 
Zimbabwean migration is circular and temporary, with migrants preferring to return to Zimbabwe on 
a regular basis to deliver necessities and remittances to family. Very few Zimbabwean migrants are 
recognised refugees: the provisions for individuals who seek refugee status and/or political asylum 
place strict limits on mobility, impeding them from returning to their country of origin, and are thus 
unfavourable to Zimbabwean migrants (Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009).  
 
Estimates place at least 3 million Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, a significant number have 
also migrated into other southern African states, mainly Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
(Leslie, 2008, p. 2). The 2009 FMSP report gave findings of focus group studies conducted in these 
four countries.  They found that few Zimbabweans noted political persecution, including harassment 
and persecution of MDC supporters by ZANU party leaders, as the main reason for their move. The 
majority of Zimbabweans pointed to the economic crisis as the main driver of their decision to 
migrate. Economic conditions cited included unemployment, hyperinflation and devaluation of the 
currency, poverty, acute shortages of foodstuffs, and the collapse of major economic and public 
service sectors, especially health care (Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009, p. 25). Another study focused on 
health found that since the March 2008 elections there were increased numbers of Zimbabweans 
receiving treatment in the South African Musina border due to the shortage of medicines in 
Zimbabwe. This situation presented for the first time a clear example of migration occurring for the 
purposes of accessing healthcare (Pophiwa, 2009, p. 4). This trend has continued, with reports in May 
2012 of Zimbabweans suffering from „sleeping sickness‟ in the Zambezi region migrating to Zambia 
due to drug shortages in Zimbabwean hospitals (Sunday Mail, 2012).  
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The mass migration of Zimbabweans in the region has far-reaching effects on the security of both the 
individuals who migrate and the locations they migrate to. With regard to public health the most direct 
concern to security is the spread of disease.  As demonstrated through the Cholera example above, the 
contagious nature of infectious diseases means that any people exposed to such diseases are at risk of 
infection. In an interview conducted in May 2012, Dr Midzi,34 the head of  Health Systems and 
Policies at WHO Zimbabwe, outlined that the danger of infectious diseases such as cholera. Of the 
individuals infected by cholera only 10 percent actually present symptoms, the remaining 90 percent 
are carriers who do not present symptoms and in most cases are unaware that they are infected. This 
presents a dilemma with regard to Zimbabwean migrants as they cross borders and introduce 
pathogens into the communities in which they live, and due to their economic constraints these 
communities are usually informal settlements with inadequate sanitation, thus the potential for disease 
to spread increases exponentially. In addition, Dr Midzi outlined that some diseases such as malaria 
flourish in areas with specific weather conditions. People who live in such areas may gain immunity 
to these pathogens, which allows them to accommodate the pathogen without presenting symptoms, 
and so they only act as carriers. When such individuals migrate, they introduce this pathogen into an 
area where there is no immunity, putting the security of the whole community at risk. He noted that 
when cases of malaria are detected in South Africa they are categorised as „imported cases‟ from 
either Mozambique or Zimbabwe, as South Africa does not have favourable conditions for the spread 
of malaria. Furthermore, as such diseases are not common to the community, community public 
hospitals or clinics may have limited expertise to manage such cases (Midzi, 2012).  
 
The intensity of the HIV epidemic in southern Africa demands particular attention. Southern Africa is 
host to the highest HIV prevalence rate in the world. Therefore, the migration of infected individuals 
unable to access treatment in their own states poses a risk to the region at large. Mozambique, 
Malawi, South Africa and Zambia provide free ART to all HIV infected persons, regardless of 
nationality. Botswana however does not, its health policy is silent on the topic of migrant and refugee 
healthcare, and only nationals receive free ART. The lack of resources in southern African states is a 
real challenge to the provision of ART to patients, nationals and migrants. Due in part to lack of 
planning or budgeting for additional clients generated by migration from Zimbabwe, the absorption of 
migrants into mainstream services has been said to put strain on available services in Mozambique 
and Malawi. In an interview conducted in May 2012 Mr Ignatius Madzongi, head of Human 
Resources at WHO Zimbabwe, outlined the problem that the migration of Zimbabweans, especially 
those who are unskilled, may have on the resources of the recipient state. These individuals become 
dependent on the social services that are meant for South Africans, or the people of Botswana, 
Lesotho, or Swaziland. “It means if they are budgeting for a certain denominator, their budget is going 
                                                          
34 In addition Dr Midzi previously served as Director, Epidemiology and Disease Control,  Ministry of Health and Child 
Welfare of Zimbabwe.  
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to be stretched. Because on the ground if someone comes with cholera, you cannot deny them 
treatment just because they are Zimbabwean, they will be attended to, but with resources that were not 
meant for them.  That can create a situation where a 12-month budget is exhausted in 9 months.” He 
went on to say that the South African government then looks as if it is not planning adequately, which 
may  cause internal political strain, which may lead their citizens to demonstrate. Conversely the 
people of South Africa can petition their government to say “these Zimbabweans are bringing 
diseases, deport them” (Madzongi, 2012).  
 
While a move to South Africa would in theory be a beneficial to a migrant from a resource-poor 
country, the gains are limited in practice due to several constraints in healthcare service delivery. As 
such, the migration of Zimbabweans to states with limited resources can have adverse effects on that 
state, its government and security. The eruption of xenophobic violence in May 2008 in South Africa 
is indicative of this. South African citizens in townships in Limpopo, Johannesburg and Cape Town 
assaulted, killed and burnt the property of foreign nationals, mainly Zimbabweans, Ethiopians and 
Somalis, stating that these foreign nationals were „stealing their jobs‟ among other reasons (Crush, 
2000, p. 107). Within the context of violence towards Zimbabweans it is important to note that there 
was a marked increase in Zimbabwean migration into South Africa due to intensified economic and 
political instability triggered by the March elections. As such, at the height of the political turmoil in 
Zimbabwe, neglected and endangered citizens migrated to South Africa, where their presence ignited 
violent reactions from South African nationals, creating a series of security risks in the areas affected. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that they had observed high levels of stress and anguish 
among foreign nationals during and after these attacks because of the continued intimidation and 
threat of arrest by police, which hindered their ability to access health care. Such individuals were 
more vulnerable to disease and exploitation.  MSF treated thousands of Zimbabweans in the wake of 
the attacks as people feared further persecution in state hospitals. A February 2009 statement said 
that:  
 
MSF remains concerned about the continued disregard for Zimbabweans‟ dignity and access to health 
care in South Africa. There is a great need for a comprehensive public campaign to raise South Africans‟ 
awareness about the plight of displaced people, in order to defuse simmering tensions – and to ensure 
vulnerable foreigners are accorded the same dignity and treatment accorded to everyone under the South 
African Constitution (MSF, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Indeed the reception of migrants within the public health systems of recipient states is highly 
problematic. A 2012 report published by the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) stated 
that South Africa received more medical migrants than any other state in the continent, the number 
increased from 327,000 in 2006 to over 500,000 in 2009. Of the total medical travel flow to South 
Africa, 80 percent were formal and informal movements from countries neighbouring South Africa, 
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especially Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However the study shows that there is 
considerable evidence that migrants living in South Africa are regularly denied their constitutional 
right to medical treatment and care by personnel at hospitals and clinics (Crush, 2012, p. 4). A 
specific study on the treatment of Zimbabwean migrants in South African public hospitals, Medical 
Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Access to Health Services in South Africa, reviewed the treatment of 100 
Zimbabwean migrants in public hospitals in both Johannesburg and Cape Town. It was found that 
Zimbabweans received compromised health care due to „medical xenophobia‟ which they define as 
the negative attitudes and practices of health sector professionals and employees towards migrants and 
refugees (Crush & Tawodzera, 2011, p. 6). Medical xenophobia manifests itself in several ways in the 
public health system. Amongst the practices uncovered by this study were the following: first, patients 
were required to show identity documentation, proof of residence status and evidence of a home 
address before treatment was provided. Patients who, for one reason or another, did not have such 
documentation on their persons could be denied treatment. Second, communication difficulties arose 
when health staff refused to communicate with patients in a common language or to allow the use of 
translators. Third, treatment was often accompanied by verbal abuse and xenophobic statements and 
insults. Fourth, non-South African patients often have to wait until all South African patients have 
been attended to even if they have been waiting longer for treatment. Finally, migrants and refugees 
had such difficulty accessing ART for HIV in public institutions that many were forced to rely on the 
NGO sector (Crush & Tawodzera, 2011, p. 8). Such practices are a fundamental breach of South 
Africa‟s Constitution and Bill of Rights, international human rights obligations and various 
professional codes of ethics governing the treatment of patients. However, the underlying sentiments 
of hostility towards Zimbabweans have permeated even the public health sector. Such considerations 
negate the fact that when foreign nationals are denied treatment for infectious diseases, not only are 
their own lives threatened but their potential to infect other individuals is increased.  
 
The collapse of the public health sector of Zimbabwe and the subsequent migration of its nationals 
into the region has led to the increased incidence of disease in border regions, the introduction of 
unfamiliar or alien strains of pathogens into recipient states and an overall increase in regional disease 
burden, all of which are a significant concern to the security of individuals in the region. In addition to 
those migrants motivated by the need for health care, many Zimbabwean migrants engage (voluntarily 
or out of desperation) in activities that compromise their own health and that of their communities. 
Zimbabwean female migrants who trade sex for money have been singled out as having a direct effect 
in the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases in border towns, with some reports 
alleging that Zimbabwean women were charging a mere US$3 for sexual transactions in certain 
guesthouses in Lusaka and Francistown, and offering unprotected sex at a higher charge (SALAN, 
2007, p. 3). The effect of such trends on the spread of HIV is apparent. FMSP notes that unlike the 
voluntary economic migrant who migrates to raise his or her quality of life and/or save money for 
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hard investments in the home country, livelihood-seeking humanitarian migrants migrate to meet their 
own and their dependants‟ basic survival needs. The migrants‟ quality of life in the host country 
remains very low, many informal cross-border traders sleep outdoors in town centres, border areas 
and bus shelters, which puts them at risk of crime and sexual violence, since a large number of these 
are women. In Manica province, Mozambique, migrants often live in shacks with no bedding, eating 
only one meal a day in order to optimise cash and in-kind remittances for the survival of dependants 
in Zimbabwe (Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009, p. 52). Literature has noted the same phenomenon in 
Botswana (Garcia & Duplat, 2007). The overall conditions that these migrants exist in are detrimental 
not only to health, but to their security and quality of life.  
 
The mass migration of Zimbabwean nationals due to the inadequate domestic provision of social 
services poses a vital and unique threat to regional security, the ramifications of which have been felt 
largely at the individual level. It is the individual that made insecure when social security provisions 
are not met, it is the individual who is forced to migrate to mitigate these conditions, and the 636 
deaths that were reported outside Zimbabwe during the 2008 cholera epidemic, show that even at the 
regional level it is the security of the individual that is threatened. As such, regional efforts to manage 
these regional security challenges must focus on the individual, as it is the individual and not the state 
alone that is largely affected.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe has clearly had adverse effects on the 
southern African region. The initiation of economic structural adjustment reforms, the costly 
intervention in the DRC war and the mismanagement of the land re-distribution programme primed 
the public health sector of Zimbabwe for collapse. Facing increasing opposition the ZANU-PF 
government became less concerned about its national obligations and focused instead on its political 
survival, channelling the remaining national reserves to its pro-land pro-ZANU-PF policies. The 
withdrawal of essential international aid and credit from Zimbabwe saw the final fall of the public 
health sector. By this point the public health sector had experienced the mass exodus of underpaid 
skilled health care workers to overseas facilities and the private sector. The grossly underpaid health 
workers that remained frequently went on strike as the government could not supply them with basic 
resources such as water, medication and gloves to ensure the continued functioning of their facilities. 
The physical infrastructure further deteriorated and most hospitals lacked the medical equipment to 
carry out basic procedures. The public health sector of Zimbabwe had deteriorated so dramatically 
that a 2008 outbreak of cholera triggered a mass exodus of Zimbabwean nationals into the region to 
access basic health care. Beset with massive shortages of staff and financial resources, the public 
health structures of Zimbabwe were completely overwhelmed. This forced the government of 
Zimbabwe to declare the outbreak a national crisis, requiring immediate international assistance. 
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When the outbreak was finally concluded, a total of 98,349 cases had been reported in Zimbabwe and 
69,255 in the rest of the region; claiming a total of 4,276 lives in Zimbabwe and 636 in the southern 
African region. This regional health crisis fully exemplifies the vital nature of the threat that 
infectious diseases pose to human security in southern Africa. 
 
It is crucial to understand that migration emerged for many Zimbabweans as the only solution to an 
economic situation that depleted access to a number of basic social services, most notably access to 
basic health care. The deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe and the resultant exodus 
of its citizens throughout the region raises concerns not only of human security, but also of regional 
stability and capacity.  SADC as the premier regional governance institution has failed to adequately 
meet the needs of migrating Zimbabweans, and to formulate policy to manage similar situations in the 
future. This situation has revealed fundamental shortcomings within SADC and among its member 
states with regard to managing vital concerns of human security at the regional level.  
 
The following chapter details the policy framework and functioning of SADC with regard to public 
health, making particular reference to the Zimbabwe case. It will also explore facets of the individual 
SADC states that have influenced their responses or lack thereof to matters of human security.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Chapter Five– Public Health and Migration: The Regional Ramifications 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The advent of migration for health purposes has raised concerns of regional stability and capacity 
within SADC as a regional institution and the individual member states of SADC: Angola, Botswana, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Through the SADC Treaty the individual 
states of the region have pledged collectively to “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, 
security and stability” (SADC, 1992).  Central to this task is the recognition that the security and 
stability of the region is dependent on the cooperation of each state; as such, it is imperative that each 
state not only harmonise its national policies with those of SADC, but ensure that the directives of 
such protocols are enforced at both the national and regional level. The constitution of the 
organisation puts forward lofty ideals of cooperation and integration to ensure among other things the 
“freedom and social justice, peace and security of all the peoples of Southern Africa” (SADC, 1992).  
 
Notwithstanding these desires SADC has not fully realised these aspirations, in part due to a lack of 
institutional capacity and resources. As noted in Chapter 4, the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe 
claimed 4,276 lives in Zimbabwe, and a further 636 in the region (WHO, 2008). While the state 
structures of the SADC nations were affected in various ways by the political and economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe, it is apparent that the largest effects were felt at the individual level. However, it will 
become apparent through this chapter that SADC is yet to fully realise the vital nature of human 
security, and the fundamental role that safeguarding the individual and his/her needs plays in ensuring 
the security of the region. The chief impediments to this realisation is due to the inherent character of 
the individual states that comprise the SADC region: Mixed profiles of state function, rigid notions of 
state sovereignty and fragmented democratic practices impede states from fully co-operating on 
security concerns, most notably concerns to human security. This section seeks to interrogate these 
impediments, with particular reference to the Zimbabwe case, the purpose of which is to further 
understand the enduring human security problematique in southern Africa.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
5.2 SADC and the Status of Public Health 
The WHO defines public health as all organised collective, public or private measures whose 
objective is to prevent disease, promote health and prolong the life of entire populations (WHO, 2007, 
p. 3). The collective response of the region to infectious diseases and public health is articulated 
through SADC. The SADC Protocol on Health, tabled in 1999, establishes that the member states 
acknowledge that a healthy population is a prerequisite for sustainable human development and 
increased productivity. As such the member states pledge to offer a full range of cost-effective and 
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quality integrated health services through regional co-operation. The key objectives of the 
organisation with regard to health are to identify, promote, co-ordinate and support those activities 
that have the potential to improve the health of the population within the region; to co-operate 
regional efforts on epidemic preparedness, mapping, prevention, control and where possible the 
eradication of communicable and non-communicable diseases; to promote and co-ordinate the 
development, education, training and effective utilisation of health personnel and facilities; to foster 
co-operation and co-ordination in the area of health with international organisations and co-operating 
partners; and to progressively achieve equivalence, harmonisation and standardisation in the provision 
of health services in the region (SADC, 1999).  
To achieve this SADC has established the following offices to implement their protocol, collectively 
known as the Health Desk: the Health Sector Co-ordinating Unit; Health Sector Committee of 
Ministers; the Health Sector Committee of Senior Officials; and Technical Sub-Committees. The 
Health Desk collaborates on key health issues, and in addition has established strong relations with 
global health organisations such as the World Health Organisation and Médecins Sans Frontières.  
Through regional cooperation and collaboration with its partners, the SADC Health Desk has 
established policies with regard to HIV/AIDS, STDs, tuberculosis control, malaria control, 
reproductive health, childhood and adolescent health, chronic diseases, emergency health services and 
disaster management (SADC, 1999).  
The most comprehensive SADC policy document with regard to peace and security is entitled the 
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO). 
Originally tabled in 2004 and reviewed in 2010, SIPO spells out in detail the plans and objectives of 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC).35 SIPO covers five main 
sectors of security: Politics and Diplomacy, Defence, State Security, Public Security, and Police.  
Under each sector the document outlines objectives, challenges posed to the realisation of these 
specific objectives and expected outcomes. Surprisingly, under both state and public security the issue 
of public health is only mentioned once. The first objective under state security states that SADC 
seeks to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising 
from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression. It is in 
this regard that public health is mentioned, the document identifies three strategies that pertain to 
health, that is: prevent the spread of the HIV and AIDS pandemic through public awareness and 
advocacy campaigns; identify the sources of opportunistic and communicable diseases and other 
pandemics; undertake HIV and AIDS education against stigmatisation and discrimination; and an 
additional umbrella objective: to promote the observance of human rights in security related issues.  
 
                                                          
35 Informally the 2004 document is referred to as SIPO I while the reviewed 2010 version is referred to as SIPO II. 
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The utility of these objectives is questionable, for instance, the second strategy states that SADC seeks 
to „identify the sources of opportunistic and communicable diseases and other pandemics‟ but to what 
end? To simply identify the source of a pandemic does not ensure its eradication, even a pandemic 
that has been identified and characterised can go on to claim many lives if a concerted strategy of 
treatment and management is not implemented. As such, these strategies are incomplete; they lack 
direction and purpose, functioning more as ideals rather than objectives. In addition, they lack detail 
and clear intent which makes the successes of such vague objectives difficult to measure. This 
anomaly is not common throughout the document; in fact the objectives with regard to conflict 
management are well articulated and detailed. For instance the goals of disarmament, demobilisation 
and repatriation, reintegration and resettlement are spoken about in detail, each specific category 
explained in depth, taking consideration of outcomes and challenges. The lax nature in which public 
health strategies are articulated is indicative of the lack of value that is placed on matters of individual 
security.  
 
No further mention is made of infectious diseases as a security matter throughout SIPO. As mentioned 
above SIPO is the most comprehensive security policy document of SADC and therefore its contents 
are reflective of the collective security concerns of the region. The omission of public health as a key 
security objective is not an oversight but rather an indication of the concerns that the states of the 
region consider vital. It is clear that infectious disease and the provision of public health is not a 
critical priority on the security agenda of SADC and its states.  
 
The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of SADC covers the organisations‟ 15 
year plans for integration and development. Once again this policy document does not focus on 
matters specific to human development and security, but rather on broad strategies to guide member 
states, SADC Institutions, regional stakeholders, and International Cooperating Partners in the process 
of deepening integration for the, “achievement of the Community‟s overarching goals” (SADC, 2001, 
p. 3). The document does acknowledge the essential role that the protection of human rights and 
security play in ensuring the achievement of positive development goals, but does not go further to 
detail how the organisation seeks to ensure security for development, or specific areas of 
securitisation. Similar to SIPO, RISDP mentions HIV/AIDS and the need to bolster support to control 
the epidemic but offers no practical strategies for implementation.  
 
Each document recognises, separately, the need to secure people but not enough detail is paid to 
specific human security threats or initiatives to mitigate human insecurity. In addition, there lacks 
congruence between the two documents, indicative of the disconnect between security and 
development policy in the region. SIPO neglects concerns of human security as the region does not 
recognise such factors as legitimate security concerns; RISDP speaks to human development and 
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human security separately but fails to merge the two to create a solid link between development and 
security. The combined result of these disparities is the large scale neglect at the policy level of vital 
threats to human security. The consequence of which is felt at the individual and regional levels, as 
the Zimbabwe case study has detailed.   
 
5.3 SADC: Concerns of Regional Capacity, Co-operation and Stability 
The Southern African Development Community would be described by Bull (2002) as a society of 
states; that is, a group of states that share common interests and values, conceive themselves to be 
bound by these common interests and values, and choose to operate in common institutions to ensure 
the achievement of shared goals and initiatives (Bull, 2002, p. 14). Central to the mandate of such 
regional bodies is the maintenance of stability and order: order being a pattern that sustains the 
elementary and primary goals of the societies and stability denoting the resistance of the region from 
unwanted change, disturbances or fluctuation (Bull, 2002, p. 17). With regard to security, SADC is 
therefore tasked with ensuring that there is a pattern of peace at individual, societal, national and 
regional levels; and measures/policies that protect the region from disturbances to this peace. The 
SADC Treaty is but one of the many protocols established by SADC to ensure the maintenance of 
stability in the region. When common treaties and protocols are not followed by member states this 
lack of co-operation may breed instability at the regional level.  
 
However, as mentioned above the inadequate response of SADC to concerns of human security is in 
part due to the lack of institutional resources and capacity. This analysis first will discuss the complex 
matter of regional capacity and move onto concerns of regional co-operation and stability 
 
Concerns of Regional Capacity 
A major impediment to the functions of SADC is funding; SADC and by default the Health Desk, is 
heavily dependent on external international funding. Due to the global economic downturn, and the 
Euro zone crisis, many of SADC‟s traditional funders have been unable to honour their pledges in 
recent years. As such the efficacy of the Health Desk in the implementation of policies and offering 
assistance to it‟s‟ member states have been greatly affected. In an interview conducted in January 
2012 in Harare, Dr David Parirenyatwa,36 former Minister of Health of Zimbabwe, recounted the 
constraints he experienced as a Minister within the Health Desk. Stating that, “the SADC Health Desk 
needs to be strengthened, methods need to be harmonised and governments need to realise that more 
money needs to channelled to the health desk”. He affirmed that though health was recognised as a 
crucial component of ensuring the well being of individuals, health was not given due priority 
                                                          
36 Dr D. Parirenyatwa is the Former Minister of Health and Child Welfare of Zimbabwe (2002 – 2009), a member of the 
ZANU-PF Politburo and currently the Director of the Centre for Health Strategies (CHEST), a SADC funded Health Policy 
NGO 
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(Parirenyatwa, 2012). When faced with limited resources, the provision of regional healthcare is 
viewed as secondary when compared with more pressing issues such as military and political 
conflicts. For instance, SADC has endeavoured to focus solely on the political facets of the Zimbabwe 
Crisis, engaging both ZANU-PF and MDC in a series of diplomatic missions since 2008, whose goal 
is to find a political agreement that is assumed will restore normalcy to the state.37 While the 
introduction of the GNU has restored some economic stability, by design it was formulated to bring 
an end to a political impasse not to rehabilitate the ailing social service sectors of Zimbabwe. As such, 
the state-centered political engagements of SADC have done little for the people of Zimbabwe in 
desperate need of health care, education and shelter. Three years after its installation, the GNU has 
failed to restore much needed basic services to the country. Public hospitals in the capital Harare are 
still without regular supplies of water or electricity. Low salaries have led to the private sector 
retaining the most skilled personnel; a 2010 report estimated that only 47 surgical doctors remained to 
service the whole country (Dube, 2010).The SADC Health Desk is yet to offer any significant 
financial or technical assistance to the public health sector of Zimbabwe.38 The SADC Secretariat is, 
instead, channelling the available resources to dissolve the political stalemate between ZANU-PF and 
MDC.  
In an interview in May 2012 conducted with Dr Timothy Stamps 39  who serves as the Health Advisor 
in the Office of the President of Zimbabwe, he outlined the inherent contradictions that are present in 
the Health Desk due to its overdependence on external funding. “As the Health Desk is not funded by 
the individual states but by international health movements – which I call the disease management 
movements – it has become more inclined to responses rather than prevention” (Stamps, 2012). Major 
components that ensure successful health outcomes, such as preventative education, are omitted to 
maximise finite financial resources. Dr Stamps is adamant that the commercialisation of public health 
management has diminished the reach of public health initiatives, both nationally and regionally. He 
also points to the dominance of South Africa in SADC as an impediment to the efficacy of regional 
health efforts, “for a long time Mr Mbeki and the so called „Dr. Beetroot‟40 denied the threat to health 
that HIV was; On the contrary it was not just a health hazard, but a hazard to the entire fabric of the 
community” (Stamps, 2012). As such, while other SADC states struggled with limited national 
budgets to provide ART to HIV patients, the Government of South Africa, with ample resources, 
                                                          
37 This diplomatic mission is ongoing, and is now lead by President Zuma of South Africa 
38 In 2008 SADC launched the Zimbabwe Humanitarian & Development Assistance Framework (ZHDAF) which reportedly 
handed over R300 million in 2009 to the Zimbabwe government for assistance in local governance. According to the SADC 
website the country used R240 million for the procurement of inputs such as maize and sorghum seed, according to a report 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development. The balance of R60 million was used for the 
procurement of fertilizer for the 2009 winter wheat season. No further reports of continued assistance have been published 
by SADC. No financial aid has been offered through SADC specifically for public health in Zimbabwe.  
39 Dr Timothy Stamps is currently the Health Advisor in the Office of the President of Zimbabwe, the former Minister of 
Health and Child Welfare of Zimbabwe (1990 – 2002) and a member of the ZANU-PF Central Committee 
40 The name given to the late Minister of Health of South Africa, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang by South African media, due 
to her insistence that natural foods such as beetroot were a better treatment for HIV/AIDS in comparison to ART.  
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denied ART not only to migrants but to its own citizens. This had adverse effects on the disease 
incidence in the region, as South Africa still remains the main destination for migration in the region. 
Furthermore, Dr Stamps asserted that due to the hegemonic projections of South Africa in SADC and 
AU, the problematic domestic HIV policies of the Mbeki regime went unchallenged. Such cases 
expose the intricate interweaving of politics and political considerations at play in regional bodies 
such as SADC. Though it is unquestionable that the health of the regions‟ population is a vital 
component of security, the translation of such an ideal into action requires a level of co-operation, 
political will, and political sacrifice that the member states of SADC are unwilling to make.  
 
With specific reference to the health of migrants, SADC published the Policy Framework for 
Population Mobility and Communicable Diseases in 2009, in which SADC acknowledges the gaps 
that exist in the provisions available for migrants in the region, and the risk this poses to their security 
and the security of those they come in contact with. The framework gives directives to the member 
states to ensure uniform policies with regards to the management and protection of the health of 
migrants and people affected by migration.41 It recognises that population mobility is a key factor in 
the spread of disease, and while some member states have strong public health services to curtail the 
spread of disease within their borders, the migration of people from states with fragile public health 
structures to such states is a reality that must be provided for. The policy makes provisions for five 
key areas: Regional harmonisation and coordination of communicable disease control; Equitable 
Access to Health Services by Cross-border Mobile Populations; Coordinated regional public health 
surveillance and epidemic preparedness; Information, Education and Health Promotion in Mobile 
Populations; Operational research and strategic information; and Legal, Regulatory and 
Administrative Reforms (SADC, 2009). The above policy stands on the shoulders of the SADC 
Protocol on Health. This protocol fully articulates the mandate of the organisation with regards to 
health and the provision of public health in the region. It makes provisions for the successful 
management of specific health concerns in the region, especially communicable diseases such as TB 
and Malaria. It asserts that close co-operation in the area of health is essential for the effective control 
of communicable diseases, the provision of  equal health care to all people, and to enrich the quality 
of health care in the region (SADC, 1999). The implementation of these policies is supervised and 
enforced by the SADC Health Desk.  
The collective directives of the above-mentioned protocols set out methods to manage and secure the 
health and livelihoods of migrants. It is therefore both ironic and unfortunate that Botswana, a SADC 
member state and the site of the SADC Health Desk headquarters, has yet to adopt and implement the 
                                                          
41 People who are not mobile may also be vulnerable to the health consequences of population mobility. For example, those 
who live in places where mobile people pass through (transit) or settle (destination) may be at risk of infection through 
interactions with mobile people. When mobile people return home (source) with new infections, their source community 
may experience the impacts of the disease. 
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SADC Policy Framework for Population Mobility and Communicable Diseases in the SADC Region. 
Botswana is documented as having the most exclusionary policy towards Zimbabwean migrants, 
regularly deporting large numbers of Zimbabweans, committing acts of refoulement 42and limiting 
their access to basic social services. At present Botswana is the only SADC country that by policy, 
denies free ART for HIV to non-nationals. (Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009, p. 47). In addition Botswana 
denies health care to refugees and individuals with asylum status, which contravenes not only the 
SADC Policy Framework for Population Mobility and Communicable Disease, but the WHO 
International Health Regulations (IHR) of 2005. It is apparent that the Government of Botswana does 
not feel obliged to follow SADC directives, the absence of any binding principles at the regional level 
means that states, such as Botswana may continue to abscond from their regional responsibilities.  
Although Zimbabwean nationals do not need to apply for access visas to travel to any of its 
neighbouring states, individuals must present a passport to be issued with a permit to cross the border.  
As noted by FMSP, these instruments do not address the type of migration caused by the crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The requirement to produce a passport, pay a fee, and provide evidence of sufficient funds 
for travel, as well as the spatial and time restrictions applicable in some cases, make these permits 
unsuited to what is in effect forced livelihood-seeking migration from an economically collapsed state 
(Monson & Kiwanuka, 2009, p. 56). Most Zimbabwean migrants do not have the financial resources 
to acquire a passport which ranges from US$53 to US$550. As a result, many Zimbabweans migrate 
through clandestine channels or use the available legal routes tactically for purposes beyond those 
intended by policy.  
 
Two key concerns emanate from the above cases: the dismissal by SADC member states of SADC 
policy and its directives; and the absence of a complete and sound policy to adequately manage the 
unique challenge that Zimbabwean migrants present. The former is due to the innate survival instinct 
of a state. State leaders and governments will consider first the consequences of each regional policy 
on domestic politics; if a policy has the potential to negatively affect domestic stability and/or the 
political legitimacy of said government, then without regard of the validity of the policy, it will in 
most cases not be implemented or enforced. Such is the case with the SADC Policy Framework for 
Population Mobility and Communicable Diseases in the SADC Region and the SADC Protocol on 
Health. Though the directives put forward by these protocols are to the benefit of the region and the 
security of its people, the potential of implementing all the prescriptions would bode negative 
consequences for some states. As such, though the states agree with the initiatives of the protocols, 
they are incompatible with the pragmatic political agendas of the state and are thus dismissed.  
 
                                                          
42Refoulementis the act of returning a refugee to a country where his or her life or freedom is at risk. Non-refoulement is a 
principle of the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees 
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The second issue presents a more convoluted problem than the self-centered nature of states.   
Literature on migration has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the binary distinction between 
refugees and voluntary migrants (Turton, 2003). Refugees benefit from guarantees of entry and 
protection under international law, while voluntary migrants who are seen as synonymous with those 
who do not apply for asylum, are left to fend for themselves. This presents a predicament when 
dealing with Zimbabwean humanitarian migrants. They opt for „dependency-resistant strategies‟ 
mostly due to the confinement imposed on asylum seekers and their desire to return to Zimbabwe 
without impediment. As the migrants coming out of Zimbabwe for the most part leave in search of 
economic and social services that Zimbabwe is no longer able to offer, they are distinctly different 
from the type of refugees fleeing military conflict. In addition the requirement of passports for entry 
dissuades migrants without these official documents from using safe and legal methods of entry. Even 
South Africa‟s initiative to regularise the documentation of Zimbabweans in South Africa failed to 
significantly curb the number of „border jumpers‟ and undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa. 
It seems the Zimbabwe quandary has pushed SADC and its member states to the limit of their 
capacity. It is clear that this case requires a novel response, one that SADC has yet to formulate.  
 
Concerns of Regional Co-operation and Stability 
The individual SADC states account for the organisation‟s inertia. The inherent characters of southern 
African states have permeated to the regional level impeding SADC from fully recognising and 
responding to concerns of human security, such as public health. The three main characteristics that 
stand in contention with effective regional action for human security are:  
 
A. State sovereignty  
While the traditional role of the state in the 21st century has been altered significantly due to the 
advent of globalisation, technology and modern travel, the state still remains the chief referent in 
international politics and principles of „state-hood‟ dominate the international arena.  The concept of 
sovereignty has therefore retained a primary role in dictating the way states interact on an 
international level.  
 
State sovereignty is defined as „the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a territory‟ 
(Malanczuk, 1997, p. 47). Such perceptions are based on realist foundations that assert that the state is 
the supreme actor and authority in the international arena (Dunne, 1997, p. 112). Central to this the 
principle of sovereignty is the notion of non-interference. International society as we describe it can 
only exist if each state recognises and respects the political independence of other states, and conducts 
itself in a way that is cognisant of this condition. For order to prevail, no state has the right to interfere 
in the internal affairs of or threaten the territorial integrity of another state. In essence this condition 
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allows every state the right to conduct itself in any way it deems fit within its borders, as long as its 
actions are not a threat to international peace and security (Krasner, 2001, p. 22).  
 
The conflict with human security is apparent. Due to the „non-interference factor‟ all actions and 
policies taken within a state are permissible, and are considered as acts of „political independence‟ 
even when these actions threaten the safety of the citizens within that state. Only when an internal 
state policy impacts the international, is it considered as a concern to international peace and security. 
Thus, many instances of grave human suffering go unchallenged, as they are covered under the 
umbrella of „internal affairs‟. The endurance of the apartheid regime in South Africa is a significant 
example of this factor, numerous threats to the security of non-white South Africans went unimpeded 
by the international community, as the actions of the apartheid government were categorised as the 
internal affairs of a political independent sovereign state.   
 
The deterioration of the public health sector of Zimbabwe is largely considered as an internal concern, 
even though it has had adverse effects on the region. Thus SADC has not responded to this concern as 
a regional security concern, but rather endeavoured to lobby the political parties of Zimbabwe to 
resolve an enduring political impasse. The tussle between human security and state sovereignty is at 
the core of the southern African human security predicament, and accounts in part for the inadequate 
responses by SADC and individual states to the human security concerns present in the region. 
Responses to insecurities of this nature are viewed as the responsibility of the individual state 
concerned and not the region, thus vital human security concerns such as the spread of infectious 
disease permeate through the region unabated.  
 
B. State supremacy  
The second point of contention follows on from the principle of sovereignty: the prevailing notion of 
state supremacy. When asked whether the states of southern Africa recognised the effects public 
health had on the region, Dr Stamps reluctantly admitted that they did not. “They are more concerned 
about political survival and money flows than about the health of individuals or communities... 
Because in Zimbabwe, and in Africa we undervalue the individual, and therefore their health is not as 
important as things like cash flow, political domination or even military activity” (Stamps, 2012).   
 
Even in the thick of the public health crisis, the government of Zimbabwe was reluctant to request 
assistance, asserting its right as a politically independent state to manage its own internal affairs. In an 
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interview conducted in January 2012 with Mr Samkange,43 the Head of Postgraduate Studies at the 
University of Zimbabwe, School of Medicine, he accounts for this:  
 
The party does not want to admit that it created a crisis, if it were to go and sit with South Africa and say 
please look after our people, it means it is admitting that it caused the migration. But it doesn‟t want to 
do that. It will label these people as ones who have run away (like Assad is doing in Syria), as ones who 
lack patriotism and would rather build South Africa than its own country, anything except refugees. And 
yet that is what they are – they are economic refugees, political refugees, security refugees – government 
doesn‟t want to admit any of those three (Samkange, 2012).  
 
The need to assert Zimbabwe as a viable, politically independent sovereign state continues to 
supersede the government‟s pledge to protect and provide for its citizens. This follows the assertions 
of Buzan (1983) who posits the existence of a maximal state, in which the state is seen to be more than 
a sum of its parts, and thus has interests and concerns of its own. In this instance the state can stand 
above the citizens, prioritising its own interests above those of its citizens (Buzan, 1983, p. 22). This is 
the prevailing nature of the state in the 21st century, and concerns of human security, such as public 
health, are not a vital concern to regional bodies or individual states. 
 
The neglect of human security in individual southern African states is a reflection of the priorities of 
the individual governments and their leaders. Mr Samkange outlined a fundamental concern with 
regard to southern African states:  
 
The crux of the matter is this: on a fundamental level, to what extent to do the agents of the various 
countries recognise their responsibility to the public? Without good governance within any one of those 
countries, inter-governmental activity is a waste of time.  And that is really the problem in the region. 
Where is accountability? Where are principles of governance? Superseding the parochial interests of the 
parties in power? There are none, so the various attempts that are being made to form regional bodies 
and movements to form regional solutions to deal with problems manifesting at the national level are 
being thwarted by the fact that none of the governments are actually accountable to their own people 
(Samkange, 2012). 
 
The absence of essential components of democracy and good governance, that is, equality, 
representation, accountability and transparency, has lead to the widespread neglect of individuals and 
their security. Without avenues to hold their leaders to account, acutely insecure populations turn to 
migration as a last resort to alleviate the insecurities they face.  
 
 
                                                          
43 Mr C. Samkange is a practising Urologist, Director of the Institute for Continuing Health Education (ICHE) College of 
Health Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, and Advisor of Human Resources for Health for the Ministry of Health and Child 
Welfare, Zimbabwe.  
69 
 
 
C. State dysfunction  
The last factor to be considered is state function; state function is a key category of analysis as it is 
widely and correctly accepted that weak, failing, failed and collapsed states are a source of insecurity 
and instability in their regions. Many definitions have been put forward for state failure (Helman and 
Ratner, 1993; Zartman, 1995; Herbst, 1997; Gurr, 1998; Mazrui, 1998; Dorff, 1999, 2005; Debiel, 
2002; Milliken, 2003; Rotberg, 2003, 2004; State Failure Task Force, 2003; Bilgin and Morton, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2004).  However, the lack of consensus on what actually constitutes a „failed state‟ makes 
the use of this concept for practical analysis and measurement ambiguous. This study rather makes 
use of the concept of state function, which acts as a positive reciprocal of the state failure narrative.  
 
Rotberg (2003) puts forward a sound approach to assessing state function that includes specific 
markers and indicators. According to Rotberg (2003) there is a hierarchy of positive minimal state 
functions: security, institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts and to ensure the rule of law, 
political participation, service delivery, infrastructure and the regulation of the economy. Strong states 
perform well across these areas, weak states have a mixed profile of performance in these areas, while 
failed states fall short in all these areas. No one indicator is a marker for state failure, rather a 
combination of state performance across these areas gives a measure of the degree of state function.  
 
When one analyses southern Africa with regard to state function, a mixed profile is presented. Three 
particular types of states emerge. While some state in the region can claim partial functionality,44 as 
they meet most of their citizens needs, the majority of southern African states are acutely 
dysfunctional.45 
The provision of social services such as health, education, food, shelter, water and sanitation are key 
functions of the state. Acutely dysfunctional states are unable to provide basic amenities and regulate 
the economy. Without access to these basic services, individuals are at risk of numerous threats to 
their security in the form of disease, malnutrition and crime to name a few.  As the Zimbabwe case 
has shown, state dysfunction can lead to the mass migration of acutely insecure populations. 
However, due to the lack of adequate social services in other southern African states, these 
insecurities may not be alleviated by the recipient state.46 State dysfunction acts a source of human 
insecurity and simultaneously impedes states from responding adequately to these concerns at both 
national and regional levels.  
                                                          
44 Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania fall into this category. 
45 Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It can be argued that the DRC is not a 
functioning state.  
46 It must be qualified that the lack of provision of social services is not always due to state negligence, but in some instances 
a mere lack of state capacity. Protracted liberation struggles, slow paced development and training programmes, coupled 
with common state problems such as corruption, have left many states without the technical expertise needed to function 
efficiently. 
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A state that lacks essential principles in its internal apparatus cannot be expected to project these 
principles at a regional level. This quagmire is at the heart of the region‟s inability to fully recognise 
and respond to concerns of human security: dominating notions of state sovereignty coupled with 
state dysfunction across the southern African sub-continent prevail at the regional level, and SADC as 
a regional body cannot be expected to engage effectively with concerns which the individual states 
that comprise it do not recognise or prioritise.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
The advent of migration for health purposes has raised concerns of regional capacity, co-operation 
and stability within SADC and the SADC states.  
 
The SADC Health Desk under the SADC Secretariat has played a minimal role in enforcing regional 
health protocols. This is due in part to a lack of funds which come mostly in the form of international 
donations. In the face of limited resources the SADC Secretariat prioritises concerns of high politics, 
such as diplomatic missions, over issues of lower concern such as regional health. With particular 
reference to the Zimbabwe case, evidence shows that though there are comprehensive protocols to 
direct SADC states with regard to regional health and the health of migrants, states such as Botswana 
selectively enforce sections of these protocols, while dismissing others, to the detriment of the health 
of migrants, their own nationals and the region as a whole.  The Zimbabwe case also reveals the 
inconsistency of SADC states, individually and collectively. While pledging through various 
agreements to “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability” (SADC, 
1992) in the region, the pragmatic undertaking of such a pledge requires levels of co-operation and 
political sacrifice that the SADC states are unwilling to make.  Lastly, the Zimbabwe case has also 
revealed a disparity that currently exists with regard to SADC policy. Though various policies exist to 
manage health and human security in the region, the combination of these still do not meet the need 
presented by the unique flow of migrants out of Zimbabwe. Due to the economic and political 
collapse, and the subsequent inability to access sound social services, Zimbabwe nationals have 
migrated throughout the region. However, the need for official documents such as passports impede 
financially strapped migrants from using legal routes of entry, and the imposition on mobility 
restrictions deters Zimbabwean migrants from seeking political asylum in other southern African 
states. The migration of Zimbabwean nationals in the region is thus largely uncontrolled, and outside 
the scope of regional migration policy. The Zimbabwe case requires novel conceptions of security 
policy that SADC is yet to formulate.  
 
While public health emanates as the most vital human security concern in southern Africa at present, 
it is by no means the only concern requiring regional attention. There are acute shortages across the 
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region of food, water, sanitation and shelter; these concerns are critical to human life and have the 
potential to affect the region. It is therefore imperative that SADC and its member states adapt their 
security perceptions and agenda‟s to recognise the security of the individual as a vital regional 
security concern. Linking security to development is an essential component to this reorientation, if 
SADC policy recognised matters of human development as security concerns, significant and 
enduring solutions could be effectively initiated across the region to ensure its security.   In addition, 
SADC must prioritise the work of the organisation‟s organs already established to manage matters of 
human security, such as the abovementioned SADC Health Desk. The work of these organs could be 
assisted by the numerous international humanitarian organisations such as UNICEF, WHO, and MSF 
which have country offices in several southern African states. Several regional programmes aimed at 
mitigating regional human insecurity, could be initiated between state governments, SADC and 
regional NGO‟s. Numerous policy options exist to ensure the region avoids and mitigates further 
regional instability caused by threats to human security.  
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Chapter Six – Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that for southern Africa the most vital concerns to security are matters of human survival 
rather than military warfare. Concerns of pervasive poverty, deepening inequality and the provision of 
basic amenities such as water, shelter and healthcare have become increasingly pertinent concerns in 
under-developed regions across the globe. It is concerns of this nature, rather than fears of nuclear 
attack, that dominate the security needs of most – if not all – people in the southern African region.  
However, as the public health crisis of Zimbabwe has detailed, while SADC and its member states 
recognise the potential threat that vital human security matters pose to the region and the subsequent 
need to intensify security at the individual level, this recognition has not translated into effective 
pragmatic action to manage these threats to human security.  
At the heart of this regional inertia are three main obstacles: the disconnect between regional security 
and development policy; the nature of the SADC security architecture; and the lack of common values 
at the state level. No one factor stands in isolation, instead these three factors function simultaneously, 
forming an intricate web of impediments resulting in inadequate responses to vital human security 
threats.  
The necessity of linking security and development has become a policy mantra: from the United 
Nations to the African Union, from national governments to academic institutions to operational 
NGOs. Aptly stated by the United Nations, “In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the 
areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development 
without security and no security without development” (UN, 2005). These vigorous calls for 
integrating security and development perspectives and policies emanate from the realisation that 
development is dependant on security and that security at the individual level is the most pertinent of 
the security concerns (Tschirgi, 2006, p. 40).  
 
At the basic level development is considered as progress in human well being. The purpose of which 
is to enlarge people‟s choices in a way that enables them to lead longer, healthier and fuller lives 
(UNDP, 1993). The wellbeing of individuals can not be enhanced in the face of enduring warfare. 
Therefore, the immediate development costs of insecurity is shown by the low levels of development 
in conflict and post- conflict regions, Sudan and the DRC stand as stark examples. However, even in 
the absence of warfare, a population must have access to adequate health care, food, water and 
sanitation, education and shelter in order to live lives free of fear and want. Security at the individual 
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level thus functions as an objective of development, as global endeavours such as the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, are dependant on and cannot be realised without first ensuring the security of 
individuals.  
 
Security at the individual level also functions as an instrument of the non-security elements of 
development (Stewart, 2004, p. 261). For instance, national economies grow and become more stable 
in the absence of conflict and human insecurity. Consequently, strong national economies ensure 
employment and income security, increased social spending by governments and the overall 
enrichment of human capabilities. In addition, high levels of development diminish insecurity at the 
individual level, as development ensures access to basic amenities such as water and shelter. 
Furthermore, highly developed states have fewer incidences of violent internal conflicts as the cost to 
societal progress is much higher.  
 
6.1 The Mutually Beneficial Connection between Security and Development  
Traditional security agendas that focused on the territorial integrity and political independence of a 
state could afford to neglect concerns of development, as matters such as healthcare and education 
had little bearing on their main objectives. However, the interconnectedness of the international arena 
in the 21st century and the evolving role of the state require an appropriate reorientation and 
restructuring of security agendas. Within the political context of the 21st century the causal 
relationship between insecurity and under-development requires the harmonisation of security and 
development policies at a national, regional and continental level. When individuals are involved in 
warfare, or are killed or displaced they can no longer work productively. In addition human security 
concerns such as political instability or the unavailability of adequate food supplies also adversely 
diminishes an individual‟s capacity to work and enhance their choices. Conversely, when a population 
has access to adequate food supplies, health care, education, water, sanitation and shelter (that is their 
basic needs are met) and their governments provide a stable economy and political climate to operate 
in – such a society is equipped with the necessary tools to maximise their human capabilities and 
choices; which will inevitably translate into the achievement of positive individual and societal 
development outcomes.  
 
It is therefore problematic that SADC has not adequately fused these two – a disparity that forms a 
major component of the security problematique of the region. There does not exist at the regional 
level an adequate policy initiative that seeks to integrate regional security concerns (which are 
predominantly human security concerns) with the goals of development. The Strategic Indicative Plan 
for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) and the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), SADC‟s most extensive policies with regard to security and 
development, respectively, do not speak to each other. While each one recognises, separately, the 
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need to protect human rights not enough detail is paid to specific human security threats or initiatives 
to mitigate human insecurity. The neglect of these concerns is indicative of structural and 
organisational impediments within SADC in responding to and managing vital human security 
concerns such as infectious disease. As such, these vital human security concerns are sidelined, 
subsequently leading to high levels of under-development across the region. The mutually detrimental 
relationship between human insecurity and under-development has resulted in systemic regional 
weakness. Which the Zimbabwe case has shown may lead to the mass migration of insecure 
individuals across the region – spelling numerous negative ramifications for the region and its states.  
 
A policy link between security and development would ensure that matters of human security are 
rightfully identified as regional security concerns. This categorisation would prioritise matters such as 
the provision of public healthcare, and ensure regional action in these areas. Secondly, as the region 
invests in these security areas, it would ultimately be investing in development, resulting in the 
aforementioned mutually beneficial positive development and security outcomes. This approach, 
rather than military or political strategies best suits the security problematique of the region.47 
 
6.2 The Security Architecture of SADC and the Lack of Common Values  
The security apparatus of SADC, encompassed in the OPDS was formed under much dispute between 
the leaders of the individual states. At the onset there were disagreements with regard to its function, 
structure, leadership and jurisdiction. The major impasse was with regard to the jurisdiction of the 
Organ: would it function under or independently of SADC? The Zimbabwe delegation argued that 
SADC was an inappropriate body to preside over sensitive security matters because it was funded by 
foreign donors. Therefore, they argued that for the Organ to operate effectively it must not be bound 
to the economic forum of SADC.48 Due to these fundamental contentions The Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation of the OPDS was only approved in 2001 and the Organ in 2003. 
Though the states agreed to allow the Organ to function under SADC, this agreement was reached 
after years of negotiations, which did not yield genuine consensus. As such, the Organ has never fully 
come under submission to SADC, failing in many instances to control or mobilise member states to 
act to ensure the security of the region; the controversial SADC interventions in Lesotho and DRC are 
testament to this (Neethling, 1999; ISS, 2004). 
 
                                                          
47 This is not to say that diplomatic/political interventions no longer serve a purpose in dealing with southern Africa‟s 
security concerns, but rather that they should be utilised in conjunction with sound human security and development policy 
initiatives. As the security concerns of the region are predominantly at the individual level. 
48 The Zimbabwe camp argued that if the Organ submitted to SADC it would open the region to manipulation from its 
economic donors. They instead envisioned a security body much like the Front Line Sates that was formed to fight 
colonialism and apartheid, functioning in a military capacity similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
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Furthermore, the protocol deals with prescriptions to manage human rights or regional interventions 
for humanitarian crises in a cursory manner.49 An amendment to reverse this disparity is unlikely 
when one considers the contentious environment that dominated the passing of this protocol, and the 
tensions that would certainly arise in light of the regions perspectives on state sovereignty.   
 
As it stands, the protection of human rights and the provision of human security do not feature 
prominently in the security agenda of SADC, this speaks to a lack of common values between the 
individual states of the region. There must be congruence in values and principles for a regional 
organisation to operate effectively and cohesively.  As noted by Nathan:  
 
I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as separate requirements 
for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in southern Africa, refers to the 
interests, gains and material conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment 
of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative 
congruence in the policies of member states that enables these states to engage in close political and 
security co-operation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to build trust, develop 
common policies, resolve or transcend their major disputes and act with common purpose in crisis 
situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is 
the glue that holds it together (Nathan, 2006, p. 606). 
 
The lack of shared principles and values at the state level impedes cohesive action at the regional 
level. States that do not prioritise the protection of human rights within their own borders will 
inevitably not propagate for the protection of human rights outside their borders. This disparity is 
evident in southern Africa where modes of fragmented democracy prevail and accountability and 
good governance are scarce. As such, when faced with a crisis as that of Zimbabwe, SADC did not 
respond adequately as its member states do not share common purpose with regards to the value of 
human life and the security of the individual.  
 
At a basic level, a state that lacks essential principles in its internal apparatus cannot be expected to 
project these principles at a regional level. This quagmire is at the heart of the region‟s inability to 
fully recognise and respond to vital concerns of human security. SADC as a regional body cannot be 
expected to engage effectively with concerns that the individual states which comprise it do not 
recognise or prioritise. Regional efficacy cannot exist where there is a vacuum in national initiative.  
 
                                                          
49 Article 2 and 11 of the protocol deal in little detail with the protection of human rights. Part of the negotiations with regard 
to the mandate of the Organ focused on the nature of concerns the Organ would deal with. One camp, comprising Botswana, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, viewed the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for co-
operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military. The other camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised military co-operation and responses to conflict. The protocol of 
the organ leans toward the Zimbabwe camp‟s desire for military cooperation; perhaps as a compromise to the previous 
camps desire to have the Organ submit to SADC which was also approved in the Protocol.  
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6.3 Towards Human Security in Southern Africa 
The vital human security threats present in the region require a merger between security and 
development policies at the regional level; substantial investment in matters vital to human survival 
such as the provision of public health care and adequate food supplies; and state reform  in the areas 
of good governance and accountable democracy. While there are other avenues to tackle these 
concerns to human security (perhaps increased collaboration between NGOs, civil society or special 
rights groups with the individual departments of the governments concerned) the most significant 
responses must come from the regional level. As SADC is state composed it serves as the 
appropriate mantle to initiate regional responses to regional concerns. In addition state driven 
regional action would provide the most effective, pervasive and enduring solutions to regional 
concerns, when one considers the state dominated political climate of southern Africa. If the region 
is to mobilize its resources effectively to manage and prevent further threats to human security 
spreading across the region, SADC as the premier regional body must be the core driver of such 
action.  
 
The public health crisis in Zimbabwe coupled with political and economic collapse has translated 
into a regional concern. However, due to the high disease burden in the region similar crises in other 
southern African states could potentially follow the Zimbabwe model. While infectious disease 
accounted for 65 percent of the lives lost in Zimbabwe in the period 2010-2011, infectious diseases 
accounted for 57 percent of total deaths in Mozambique and Zambia, 50 percent in South Africa and 
47 percent in Malawi.50 These figures, which are expected to rise, are indicative of not only of a high 
disease burden but state weakness in the area of public health provision.   
 
When one views these statistics in light of state dysfunction and the interconnected nature of the 
region, the potential for the Zimbabwe case to be replicated becomes more probable. Zimbabwe‟s 
government is infamous for its human rights abuses; however, this profile is not isolated. Clashes 
between anti-government forces and the defence forces of the late President Mutharika of Malawi 
injured 44 individuals, and left 19 dead in January 2012 (Mapondera, 2012, p. 1).  Acute food 
shortages in Mozambique led to the eruption of violent clashes between demonstrators and police in 
Maputo in 2010, resulting in the death of 13 people, 142 arrests and 443 injuries (BBC, 2010, p. 1). 
Even the government of South Africa, which has been heralded for its progressive constitution, has 
come under immense criticism for sanctioning the use of live ammunition on striking miners, 
claiming 34 lives in August 2012 (White, 2012, p. 1). Taking these factors into consideration: the 
high disease burden in the region, the inadequate  provision of public healthcare at the state level, the 
mixed state profiles of political instability and dysfunction, and the propensity for individuals to 
                                                          
50 Figures inferred from Fig 3.5  
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migrate to mitigate their insecurities; it becomes apparent that  though Zimbabwe serves as the 
pioneer example of the scope and nature  of the threat vital human security concerns pose to the 
region, many other southern African states have the potential to pose similar threats to the region.  
 
While public health emanates as the most vital human security concern in southern Africa at present, 
it is by no means the only concern requiring regional attention. There are acute shortages across the 
region of food, water, sanitation and shelter; these concerns are critical to human life and have the 
potential to affect the region.  
 
So how does one conclude a study on a matter as complex as that presented here? I propose that this 
final thought serves not as a conclusion but as a strong recommendation of the principal step the 
region must employ in order to effectively manage its unique security concerns. The security 
problematique of southern Africa is multi-faceted and extensive in its scope. However, at the 
fundamental level it requires a departure from the state-centered security approach that dominates 
not only the study of security but international security agenda‟s in the 21st century. The study began 
by quoting the African Leadership Forum, as it aptly conceptualised the impediment at the core of 
the regions security predicament:  
 
The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. (It) must be constructed in terms of the 
security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully 
participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights 
(African Leadership Forum, 1991 cited in Hough, 2004).  
 
SADC must mobilise its member states and reform its security architecture to recognise insecurity at 
the individual level as a legitimate regional security concern. Human security concerns dominate the 
security needs of the region, any effort that negates the primacy of securing the individual stands in 
contention with the realisation of a stable and safe sub-continent. Any effort to ensure the safety of the 
region must begin with this fundamental change in the conceptualisation of security in the region. 
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Appendix A  
Map of southern Africa51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Source: Nathan. L (2012) Community of Insecurity: SADC‟s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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Appendix B 
Raw Data and Formula for Figure 3.5 - Causes of Death in Southern Africa 2010–2011 
Country 
 
Population52 
 
Death Rate per 
100053 
 
Crude Deaths54 
 
Angola  19,618,000 12.06 236,593.08 
Botswana   2,031,000 12.00 24,372 
DRC   67,758,000 10.80 731,786.4 
Lesotho   2,194,000 15.80 34,665.2 
Malawi   15,381,000 12.84 197,492.04 
Mozambique   23,930,000 12.79 306,064.7 
Namibia   2,324,000 13.09 30,421.16 
South Africa   50,460,000 17.23 869,425.8 
Swaziland   1,203,000 14.21 17,094.63 
Tanzania  46,218,000 11.92 550,918.56 
Zambia   13,475,000 12.42 167,359.5 
Zimbabwe    12,754,000 12.38 157,894.52 
 
Deaths due to TB  
 
Deaths due to  
HIV/AIDS 
 
Deaths due to 
other infectious 
diseases55 
 
Total Deaths Due 
to Infectious 
Diseases56 
Percentage of 
Deaths due to 
Infectious 
Disease57 
 6,500  11,000  91,095  108,595 46% 
 430  5,800  1,536  7,766 32% 
 34,000  33,000  423,748  490,748 67% 
 290  14,000  2,657  16,947 49% 
 1,700  51,000  40,742.07  93,442.07 47% 
 11,000  74,000  92,167  177,167 58% 
 580  6,700  2,567  9,847 32% 
 25,000  310,000  96,955  431,955 50% 
 380  7,000  1,641  9,021 53% 
 5,800  86,000  135,871  227,671 41% 
 2,600  45,000  48,262  95,862 57% 
 3,400  83,000  16,924  103,324 65% 
                                                          
52 Data derived from United Nations World Population Prospects: 2011 revision: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-
Data/mortality.htm 
53 Data derived from United Nations World Population Prospects: 2011 revision: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-
Data/mortality.htm 
54 Calculated with the following formula: [DEATH RATE/1000] X POPULATION  
55 Data for Causes of Death for each state derived from: http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/world-health-rankings 
56  Calculated with the following formula: SUM of DEATHS DUE TO TB, DEATHS DUE TO HIV/AIDS, DEATHS DUE 
TO OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASES  
57 Calculated with the following formula: [TOTAL DEATHS DUE TO INFECTIOUS DISEASE/ CRUDE DEATHS] X 100  
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Appendix C 
In-Depth Interview Questions 
 Do you think Health is a Security issue/concern? 
 Does the government/department of public health recognise that its deterioration is a 
threat/concern to the region? 
 Do you think there has been adequate inter-governmental interaction and/or policy with regard to 
health in the region? 
 Can the SADC Health Desk adequately meet the health needs of the region? 
 Does Health receive the adequate attention in the country that it requires? 
 Does Health receive the adequate attention in the region that it requires? 
 Do you have any additional comments? 
